

confronted with various trolley scenarios. He discovered that the switch case elicited increased activity in the regions of the brain associated with reasoning. Most people (87%) approve of flipping the switch. The footbridge case, however, elicited increased activity in the regions of the brain associated with emotion. Most people (69%) disapprove of pushing the man.⁷ Greene concluded that “in the footbridge dilemma, sacrificing one person for the greater good seems wrong, a gross violation of individual rights. In the switch dilemma, trading one life for five seems justified, if not ideal.”⁸

Moral Assessments of the Trolley Scenarios

How do we account for what “seems wrong” or “justified”? In general, philosophers have proposed two different approaches to moral assessment: teleological or deontological. Deontological theories “emphasize the nature of the act . . . These theories hold that something is inherently right or good about such acts as truth telling and promise keeping and inherently wrong or bad about such acts as lying and promise breaking.”⁹ Alternatively, teleological theories “focus primarily on consequences in determining moral rightness and wrongness.”¹⁰ “Teleological theories, then, make the right, the obligatory, and the morally good dependent on the nonmorally good.”¹¹ Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is often used as the deontological representative, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) the teleological representative.

In Kant’s theory, the moral standard that is usually thought of as central is a version of what he calls the “categorical imperative”: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”¹² Joshua Green suggests “a rough translation: Don’t use people.”¹³ In John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian theory, the moral standard is utility or happiness, the nonmoral good: “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”¹⁴ In Greene’s summary: “Maximize happiness impartially.”¹⁵

These theories offer contrasting moral assessments of Philippa Foot’s case as well as the switch and footbridge cases. Kant would likely disagree with Foot that the driver of the trolley should

“do the least injury he can,” implying that he should steer away from the five and toward the one. Kant would probably recommend that the driver do nothing and avoid taking positive action to use one person to avoid injuring five others. I believe his recommendation would be the same in the switch and footbridge cases. We should not take any action in which one person is used only as a means to benefit others. Mill would disagree with Kant in all three cases and recommend an action in which one person is sacrificed for five: In Foot’s case, steer the trolley toward the one; in the switch case, flip the switch; and in the footbridge case, push the man. These actions will “maximize happiness impartially.”

The recommendations of the two modern moral theorists are not consistent with most people’s intuition about what should be done. Is there a better theory? An older theory that originated with Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) has been used for centuries in the analysis of similar cases. This theory is called the “doctrine of double effect.”

The doctrine says, roughly, that it is always wrong to do a bad act intentionally in order to bring about good consequences, but it is sometimes permissible to do a good act [when the bad effect is foreseen but not intended and the good effect is at least equivalent in importance to the bad act] despite knowing that it will bring about bad consequences.¹⁶

How does the doctrine apply to the three cases? One philosopher explains,

It would be wrong to throw someone into the path of a runaway trolley in order to stop it and keep it from hitting five people on the track ahead; that would involve intending harm to the one as a means of saving the five. But it would be permissible to divert a runaway trolley onto a track holding one and away from a track holding five: in that case one foresees the death of the one as a side effect of saving the five but one does not intend it.¹⁷

The conclusion is the same in Foot’s case: It is permissible to steer the trolley toward one man because his death is unintended. This analysis is consistent with Greene’s finding that most people believe it is permissible to flip the switch but not push the man.

Relevance to Driverless Cars

Let us start with the following scenario:

Imagine someone is driving down a country road and a whole gang of people jump out in front of her car. There's an escaped convict, a toddler, a mother with a baby, a 95-year-old war veteran, and a small kitten called "pickle." She can't break or swerve and she's going to kill one of them. Which should she pick?

In this scenario, all the moral theories recommend the same answer: Pick the small kitten. For Kant, the reason is that the kitten is not a person. For Mill, an animal certainly has some utility value but not as much as a human being. For an adherent of the doctrine of double effect, picking the kitten is permissible because its death is not intended, and the good effect is at least equivalent in importance to the bad act.

In a scenario involving a driverless car,

Imagine a driverless car going down a narrow street. The passenger inside has no control whatsoever of the behavior of the vehicle. Suddenly a group of five people steps off the pavement and onto the road. The car registers the danger immediately, but it is already too close to stop before hitting the group. The only possible evasive maneuver is to swerve to the side. But in so doing, the car will crash into a passerby who is walking down the street.

In another version of this scenario, the car does not swerve into a bystander but rather into a solid wall. In doing so, the car will probably sacrifice its passenger in order to avoid hitting the group of five people.

Which case does this scenario most resemble: the Foot, switch, or footbridge? The scenario is not like the footbridge case because a person is not used to avoid harming or to save other people. The scenario might be like the Foot case if it involves a conflict of two negative duties. It resembles the switch case in that it might involve a conflict either between two negative duties (avoid injuring one or five people) or between a negative and positive duty (sacrifice one person to save five people).

How should the car be programmed? According to Kantian theory, the car should be programmed to stay the course, that is, to run over the group of five. Of course, the result is not "intended." It seems straightforward that in utilitarian theory the car should be programmed to avoid hitting the five and swerve into the passerby

(saving five maximizes happiness). In the second version of the scenario, Should the car be programmed to sacrifice its own passenger? Many will say, Of course not, if I am the passenger! Kant would agree, but not for self-interested reasons. He would say that no one inside or outside the car should be used only as means to the end of saving (or avoiding harm to) others. Applying the doctrine of double effect is not straightforward because a car does not possess intention. One might say that the car only executes the intention of the programmer, which could not be to harm anyone. If so, the utilitarian recommendation is morally preferred.

Consider a different kind of scenario: a pedestrian in the crosswalk. In this case,

a car is stopped at a traffic light, and a pedestrian is in the crosswalk directly in front of it. The car detects that a truck is coming too fast from behind and will hit the car. The car cannot move forward without hitting the pedestrian. The car has two options. It can do nothing, allow itself to be hit by the truck, and hit the pedestrian. On the other hand, the car can move forward and hit the pedestrian but avoid being hit by the truck.

The recommendations of our moral theorists are less straightforward in this scenario. For Kant, the moral course of action seems clear: do nothing. The car should not be programmed to use anyone only as a means. Given that the car will actively or passively hit the pedestrian, what utilitarian calculation will maximize happiness impartially? In either course of action, the fate of the pedestrian is the same. The utilitarian might recommend hitting the pedestrian to avoid damage to the car, which would be the action that maximizes happiness overall. But is the maximization impartial? Or partial to the driver? Since a programmer, not the driver, made the decision, perhaps it is.

If the programmer has moral integrity, that is, a good intention, an advocate of the doctrine of double effect might follow either the utilitarian or Kantian recommendation. On the other hand, the doctrine might not be relevant in this case because, in either course of action, there is only one effect on a person. The other effect is damage to the car. The scenario contains no information about the wellbeing of the truck driver or the driver of the car. Will either or both be harmed in any way?

Issues in Moral Programming

The integrity of the programmer depends on the moral program. What is the best program? In his fMRI experiments, Greene uncovered evidence for three evaluative distinctions: action/omission, means/side effect, and personal force/no personal force. Action, means, and personal force push our emotional buttons; omission, side effect, and not personal force do not. We feel that pushing the man in the footbridge case is morally wrong because harm is caused as the means to an end by an action with personal force. Greene argues that Kant's theory is based on this feeling. His theory is a rationalization of automatic emotional responses. As already noted, emotional parts of the brain light up in fMRI experiments when people are exposed to the footbridge case. Utilitarianism is based on reason, and, in the absence of the emotional buttons, the parts of the brain that involve reasoning light up in fMRI experiments when people are exposed to the switch case (as previously mentioned). At the deepest level, the differences between moral theories derive from a conflict between emotion and reason.¹⁸

Given this conflict, moral psychology will not help us identify the best program. But if driverless cars become an integral part of our society, someone will have to make programming decisions. Who will decide which moral theory to use? One option is to allow consumers to decide through their purchases. Manufacturers can program cars to meet the demand. This does not seem to be a viable option because of the conflicts that will inevitably arise, as illustrated in our scenarios, not to mention the problem of how the legal system will adjudicate the many lawsuits that will be filed. More likely, the national government will appoint an ethics board or enact regulations. State governments may start the regulatory process, but eventually the national government will become involved to ensure consistency across the states.

This does not mean that the rulings of an ethics board or government regulations will be morally consistent, but it is difficult to see how morality in this area will not be imposed on all citizens. Any moral program will be controversial. Will we have to abide by the decisions of congressional representatives, or, in the final analysis, by one justice of the supreme court in a 5 to 4 decision?

A concluding question: Once the program is in place, will citizens be relieved of moral responsibility for what their cars do?

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¹ Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect," in *Oxford Review*, Vol. 5, 1967, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³ Terrance McConnell, "Moral Dilemmas," in Edward N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, June 30, 2014, p. 2. Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=moral+dilemmas>.

⁴ Lauren Cassani Davis, "Would You Pull the Trolley Switch? Does it Matter?" in *The Atlantic*, October 9, 2015, p. 2. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/trolley-problem-history-psychology-morality-driverless-cars/409732/>

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Joshua Greene, *Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them*, Penguin, New York, NY, 2013, pp. 115-116.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁹ Louis P. Pojman and James Fieser, *Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong*, 6th ed., Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, 2009, p. 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹¹ William K. Frankena, *Ethics*, 2nd ed., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1973, p. 14.

¹² Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), Lewis White Beck, trans., Macmillan, New York, NY, 1959, p. 47.

¹³ Joshua Greene, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁴ John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism* (1861), George Sher, ed., Hackett, Indianapolis, IN, 1979, p. 7.

¹⁵ Joshua Greene, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

¹⁶ Louis P. Pojman and James Fieser, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁷ Alison McIntyre, "Doctrine of Double Effect," in Edward N. Zalta, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/>.

¹⁸ Joshua Greene, *op. cit.*, Chapter 9, pp. 211-253

Nation and Nationalism in Historical Perspective

Introductory Remark

In the current historical period of significant development of populism, the concepts of nation and nationalism are frequently discussed not only in the academia, but also in the popular media and political arena. A nonnegligible number of activists, politicians and journalists associate them with racism, right wing extremism and xenophobia, and/or with propagandistic notions like “white supremacy,” “white nationalism” and “eurocentrism.” For this reason, I focus in this brief paper on the true and real meaning of the concepts of nation and nationalism, and on their historical roots.

The Concept of Nation

In accordance with the classical definition, the nation is a community of human beings who have:

- common ethnic origin,
- common language,
- common history,
- common culture,
- common religion (frequently, but not always),
- common territory (frequently, but not always),
- consciousness of their unity, essence and identity,

or according to the most frequently quoted definition (not only in the Marxist literature but also in the Western liberal academic literature, although it was given by Stalin!) “the nation is a stable community of human beings, historically developed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychology expressed

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in a common culture.” In another translation “a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”

The Dictionary.com defines a nation as “a large body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government, particularly its own.”

In turn, the *Cambridge English Dictionary* explains the concept of nation as being

“a country, especially when thought as a large group of people living in one area with their own government, language and traditions.”

For better understanding the concept of nation it is useful to compare it with the concepts of people and elite.

According to the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* a people is “a group or assembly of human beings united by a common interest,” and according to *Wikipedia* “a people is a group of individuals who belong and act in a specific society.”

Taking into consideration additional definitions, it is possible to affirm that in accordance with the most points of view, the main characteristics of a people are:

- common origin,
- language (to a large extent) common,
- territory (to a large extent) common,
- survival (usually) in a state, or in a state like political structure,
- consciousness of its survival as a people, and to a large extent consciousness of its unity, but only limited consciousness of its identity caused by the lack of a common economy and culture.

In parallel, the elite is defined as “the group of people who embodies what is the best, the most valuable, in a community, society, etc.”

Comparing the concepts of nation and people one observes without any difficulty that the nation is the superior stage – and until present the last – stage in the evolution of a people. The nation is different from the people because it has as essential definitory characteristics: a unitary language (and not significantly

differentiated dialects), a relatively developed common culture usually associated with the common language, and – very important – the consciousness of its identity as a distinct group of people.

From the point of view of the definitory elements of the concepts of nation and people, any nation is a people but not any people is a nation. The nation emerges only at a specific point in time in a people's evolution. In the 19th century the Spaniards, the Italians, the Germans or the Britons were nations, but in the 16th century they were peoples.

If the difference between nation and people refers to the elements of the concepts, the difference between nation and elite is given by the spheres of the two concepts. Any elite is a portion of a nation or people. But any nation or people is not a part of an elite.

The Concept of Nationalism

In the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, nationalism is defined with a large meaning as “loyalty and devotement to a nation,” and with a special meaning as “a sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its own culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups.”

Similarly, *Encyclopedia Britannica* defines nationalism as “ideology based on the premise that the individual's loyalty and devotion to the nation state surpass other individual or group interests.”

Comparing various definitions of nationalism, one observes that they can be included in two different groups. One group includes definitions that refer to common ancestry, language, territory, culture and consciousness of identity, but do not regard one nation as being superior to others. The definitions included in the second group include all or some of these elements, but emphasize – or even strongly emphasize - the idea of the one nation's (the nationalist's nation) superiority over other nations or peoples.

Apparently, this difference is not very significant, but in practice it is, and it entails important socio-economic and political consequences going from tensioned international relations to all-out war. It is something comparable to what happened with other concepts and words – socialism for example. For many European

countries and parties, socialism means social democracy and promotion of social rights, for Marxist-Leninists it has meant a transitory stage between capitalism and communism, and for the German National Socialists was Hitler's political doctrine. Therefore, it is important and necessary to use in English two different words for the two different concepts as it is done in other languages like French or Romanian.

The word "nationalism" should be used only for the concept of nationalism that does not stress the superiority of a nation over another, which is the classical one and historically emerged the first. And the words "chauvinistic nationalism" must be used for the concept that emphasize the superiority of one nation over another.

The distinction between nationalism and patriotism is also important because they are frequently used as being similar although they are not. The concept of patriotism is probably as old as peoples are, and the word denominating it has its origin in "patria," the more than two thousand years old Latin word for country. Significantly different, the concept and word nationalism are only two hundred years old and originate from the concept of nation.

In the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* patriotism is defined as "love for or devotion to one's country," and in *Encyclopedia Britannica* as "feeling of attachment and commitment to a country, nation, or political community." Similarly, *Dictionary.com* describes patriotism as "devoted love, support, and defense of one's country; national loyalty," and *Wikipedia* states that "patriotism or national pride is the feeling of love, devotion and sense of attachment to a homeland and alliance with other citizens who share the same sentiment."

Subsequently, taking into consideration these definitions, it is undoubtful that the two concepts are not similar. The relationship between the two concepts is one from the general to particular, patriotism being the general concept and nationalism the particular one. In other words, any type of nationalism is also patriotism, but any type of patriotism is not nationalism. The fighters for the unification of Italy in the 19th century were patriots and nationalists because the Italian nation emerged at the end of 18th century and beginning of the 19th century. But the great personalities of the Italian Renaissance were only patriots because in the 15th and 16th centuries there was only the Italian people, but not the Italian nation.

Historical Emergence of Nationalism

The nationalism as an ideology and incentive for political and military action emerged at the end of 18th century and beginning of the 19th century in Europe. At that time most European peoples had attained the nation stage in their ethnic, political, economic and cultural evolution because several historical conditions had been fulfilled.

Those conditions that had been necessary for the transformation of peoples into nations were:

- apparition and consolidation of centralized unitary states
- development of communications
- unification and homogenization of language
- development of common economy
- development of common culture
- development of national identity

The emergence and development of nationalism was stimulated by the following factors:

- struggle for liberation from imperial domination
- struggle against foreign occupation
- struggle for creation of national states
- struggle against colonialism
- struggle for preservation of national culture and national moral, political and social values

The emergence and development of nationalist ideology in Europe was stimulated in a complex manner by the ideas of the French Revolution of 1789 and by the Napoleonic campaigns. As a result of the spreading of Enlightenment ideas promoted by the French Revolution and Napoleon himself, the Europeans started to perceive themselves as citizens belonging to nations living in nation-states and not as subjects of kings and emperors. But at the same time they realized their civic responsibilities and they felt that it has been their duty to fight for the freedom and independence of their countries or for the unification of the provinces in which they were living.

The Spanish nationalists fought against the Napoleonic military occupation in order to preserve the unitary state created in the 15th century by Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile. And that was a popular war of national liberation, although the political values promoted by post-revolutionary Napoleonic France were

superior to those existing in Spain at that time as it is proved by the fact that the current meaning of the word “guerilla” emerged during that war.

At the beginning of the 19th century the German nationalists fought against Napoleon for defending the independence of their states, and in the second half of the 19th century for the unification of Germany. The same goal of liberation from foreign occupation, national unification and independence was followed and finally achieved by the Italians and Romanians in the second part of the 19th century and by the peoples of the Hapsburg Empire and Soviet Union in the 20th century.

Therefore, it is possible to affirm at the end of this brief paper, that nationalism – as significantly different from chauvinistic nationalism – has been an ideology and political movement that has had a very important role in the liberation of peoples from empires’ domination, national unification, international recognition of state independence as well as in nations’ political, social economic and cultural progress.

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Redefining Identity: European Unification as Transcultural Challenge

If we talk about identity, we should not forget why the people said “no” to Communism: (1) *Because of its cynical concept of human rights.* Rights were granted to individuals by the State in exchange for loyal social behavior. Such practice attempted to justify the government’s cruel control of people’s destinies in the name of revolutionary ideals. The regime graciously granted what it had ruthlessly deprived them of. (2) *The Central and Eastern European revolution was directed against the Communist “command economy.”* Seventy years after the Bolshevik *coup d’etat*, 48 million Soviet citizens lived below the poverty level as measured by Soviet standards! And (3) *The revolution pulled down the central pillar in the political structure of socialist society:* the permanent and unconditional monopoly of power held by the Communist Party and its government. The party of Marxism-Leninism acted as authentic interpreter and implementer of the monolithic will of the people. Such understanding was not only the pillar of Communist totalitarianism but also one of the main (though not the only) causes of the social crisis and central obstacle in overcoming that crisis. What happened in Central and Eastern Europe was a victory for the people in their struggle for freedom and for the implementation of fundamental human rights.

It was by no means inevitable that these developments would unfold in a linear fashion in the direction of free democracy, with a sound economic basis, which is a precondition for genuine stability. The reforms are irreversible. But the outcome of the ongoing process remains uncertain, even when the people involved know exactly the

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ultimate goal towards which they are working. My notes attempt to shed light on the subliminal contradictions between the intended results and the unintended consequences of the measures taken.

The “old boys’ network” of party cadres in Culture, Economy, and Administration which was not abolished but has been “redirected” (*gewendet*) presents a most destructive challenge for the creation of the new societal order. According to Vaclav Havel, “As a result of ideological targets, political loyalties, varied favours or extortionist commitment, the single-party system established long-term personal ties and dependencies on an unusually large scale. The links extended into the most remote corners of society and above all of the apparatus of state, where the Communist *nomenklatura* generally existed beneath the headquarters level.”¹ What is more, a major enzyme for its cohesion and loyalty towards the political system was its opposition to the Federal Republic of Germany, which represented a permanent challenge.

Against this background, the last Communist government in East Berlin after mid-November 1989 managed, on a substantial scale to cover up the destruction of the State Security Service (*Stasi*) files incriminating the Communist regime against the opposition of the population and transferred considerable assets to Stasi members, which not only gave the recipients financial benefits but also, in many instances, safeguarded positions of political power.

Ferdinand Kroch’s analysis for eastern Germany in 1992 reflects the East in general:

Wherever they can, former Communist power elites are taking hold of the “economic foundation” by buying profitable companies and handing over the remaining mass of firms to the taxpayer. At the same time, like-minded comrades at the “intellectual superstructure” level are not only ensuring that no public fuss is made about these activities, but also that the tremendous reconstruction attempts by the new democratic state and by the free and western-oriented market forces are presented as perfidious action against the people. The success of such power retention strategies by those who ruined the GDR under their rule impedes and jeopardizes the process of restructuring in eastern Germany.²

This leads to Kroch’s questions which still remain unanswered today: “To what ends will the forces trained in Communist conspiracy, strategy, and tactics exert their influence? Is

financial gratification the only aim? Will the Communist forces be willing to accept compromise and to demonstrate loyal cooperation, as observed among the former elites in other revolutions, or can a different code of behavior be expected in the case of the Communists?"³

The persistent re-naming of the revolution to "re-irection"/ "change" (*Wende*) by those forces eloquently reflects the longstanding efforts for legitimization as practiced by representatives of the old regimes which would not have been possible without the "tolerance" of the citizens' movement.

In the Fall of 1989, the need for theories existed which, freed from the East-West conflict, questioned the origin of the identity crisis, searched for criteria of new social ethics, and demanded viable political ideas.

According to Helga Schubert at a forum discussion of the Adenauer Foundation: "In general, these groups reflected political currents of thought whose political goals and hopes were associated with the continued existence of the GDR with a reformed socialist-style systems. Reforms were the main aspects. The revolution was a result, not the aim of activities during the take-off phase."⁴

The revolutionary ambitions before 9 October 1989, were in large hindered by the different national self-awareness in West Germany. As Vettig summarizes:

Following the ideological revolution of the West German Left in 1968, there was often a conviction in the corresponding circles that the Germans should never again become a nation in view of their past national guilt. They had discredited themselves once and for all through their former national ambitions and had to expiate their guilt by renouncing not only a nation-state but also a national identity. Many leftists also took the view that the Germans should never again be allowed to exercise far-reaching decision-making powers. In some left-wing circles, therefore, the elimination of German nature became an undisputed postulate. Adding to the foreign policy goal on integration, those who held such views also postulated the domestic policy goal of creating a "multicultural society." An overlaying of German nature through alien components was regarded and encouraged by such circles as progress towards greater humanization. The envisaged *denationalization of the Federal Republic of Germany was perceived as a prelude to the Europe and worldwide elimination of "national-*

narrow-mindedness” in general. Notions of this kind explained why some left-wing German intellectuals failed to understand and to accept the unification of their native country in 1989/90.⁵

It was during this culmination phase of the revolution, which lasted about six months, from 9 October 1989 to 18 March 1990 that the German masses in the East insisted on the termination of the division of their country. It was their pressure “from below” which formed the policy and created history.

It is clearly evident that the reunified Germany has irrevocably become part of the West and that the dissolution of the Soviet empire could not change this in the least; it had not created the “Russian Option.” The only realistic question was: Where would the eastern frontiers of Atlantic civilization run in the future?

But what exactly is European Identity? “To me, all those nations are European which were exposed during the course of their history to the three-fold influence of Athens, Rome and Jerusalem,” Paul Valery declared in a famous lecture he gave in the twenties.⁶

Today, without hesitation, we would also mention Celtic, Germanic, as well as Slavic roots. Nor should the influence of Arabic countries be ignored. And in this connection, would it be wrong to refer to the scientific and liberal approach, or to Romanticism and Socialism?

Precisely which western values are basic to democracy? Inevitably, the focus falls loosely on the set of values called “individualism,” however vague and slightly pejorative the term may sound. Western democracy has been founded on a specific understanding of the individual as an autonomous being. This understanding means that the individual has a capacity for freedom, for realizing himself in the course of his actions, and that he has inherent rights over and against the demands of any community to which he may belong.

It is not difficult to trace the source of these notions in the convergence of two cultural streams: the first originates in biblical religion, with Protestantism playing a decisive role in its application to political democracy; the second, rooted in the Hellenic view of man, transmits to modernity via the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, as applied to the French Revolution and its successors.

But just as democracy is an idea that manifests itself in concrete institutions and social processes, so the autonomous individual is not only an idea but also a lived experience. Actual human beings must feel themselves to be autonomous, to be free or aspiring to freedom, to have inherent rights.

Experiences through which these ideas and values become plausible in actual life are necessary. That Western individualism has been challenged from within Western culture, notably by Marxism, complicates the situation. The unusual assumptions of Western individualism become sharply evident as soon as one compares them with what is taken for granted in the great majority of non-Western cultures, in all parts of the world, and indeed in the traditional substrata of Western societies as well, as in the remaining peasant cultures of southern Europe.

As Peter L. Berger states, “democracy is not a ‘luxury of the rich,’ as has been argued; the rich, with or without democracy, usually manage to take care of themselves.”⁷ If democracy is indeed a political structure to safeguard the rights and liberties of the individual, it also happens to offer the most plausible structure for the protection of traditional values.

The state is not the only threat to traditional values. Other modern institutions and processes, the focus of the market and of technology, modern urban life, mass communication, create their own threat.

The history of the European Union as an institutional mechanism of democracy shows that it not only allows but also creates breathing space to traditional values and institutions. Only the democracy fosters pluralism and coexistence between modernized and more traditional sectors of society.

But what is essential to all this, democracy is the most practical method for safeguarding those “mediating structures” that are, themselves, the matrix of democracy. “Mediating structures” are institutions that give shape to people’s private identities but also help them relate to the large structures of modern society. These institutions exist both in highly modern and in less developed societies. They are important to both. The most important of these are the *family*, *organized religion*, and the *local community*.

Others are such innovations as *cooperatives*, *labor unions*, and various *associations* to protect or promote particular interests.

Virtually everywhere, people have a strong interest in these institutions because their most precious values and self-identifications are closely bound to them.

As we all have experienced in the past, totalitarian states, by their very nature, cannot tolerate even the relative independence of such institutions. These must be leveled, controlled, and integrated into the all-embracing polity. Six years after the "velvet revolution" the situation in the former Communist states asks for a spirited Westernization of public life.

The lack of a more thoroughgoing democratic component within the all-European framework has meant that "there has been little discussion during more recent times about the meaning and the purpose of the EU," as F. Michael Prince points out.⁸ European integration was a product of an early post-war desire:

To preempt any resurgence of the kind of eruptions that precipitated the Second World War. This desire was welded together with the promise of prosperity for all to create the political and economic conditions that would reduce the likelihood of war. As a process of this post-war need for security and reassurance, the EU today is confronted by the fact that it no longer possesses the *Wert an sich* (self-evident value) it once did; its appeal to a so-called post-materialist culture, spoiled by the expectation of prosperity and peace, has ebbed.⁹

As the transparency of the European policy-making structure grows dimmer and the number of members grows larger, the greater will become the need for the cultures to renew public commitment to the idea of Europe.

It is not so much diversity in the sources of European cultural identity which is challenging, but rather the influence that such sources brought to bear on the principle of unity, that unity which is subliminally linked with this identity. Joseph Burckhardt formulated this as follows: "If, in largely intellectual matters, we do not feel we belong to this or that people, no longer to this country or that country, but feel that our allegiance is to Western culture, then this is because the world was once Roman and all-embracing and the whole culture of antiquity has devolved upon us."¹⁰

A multifarious cultural identity has developed from this melting pot over the centuries and continues to flourish to the present day. And precisely here the great wealth of our continent is to be

found. Far from preserving unchanged what has been attained, by fearfully retiring into a cultural shell, this multifarious cultural identity constitutes a factor of living and original synthesis that is constantly renewing itself. This kind of identity consequently emerges as the precondition for individual, group, and national progress. It stimulates and establishes a community of interest, mobilizes inner reserves for action, and provides creative adjustment from necessary changes.

Denis de Rougement emphasized this:

Each one of our cultures has to re-find its personality, because fruitful dialogue is possible only between partners who are quite different and who know what they want, or who they are, or who at least passionately wish to fathom it. Nevertheless, none of our cultures, which have been personified this way, is an end in itself. Culture means just the totality of the means that are made available to people; they depend on culture in order to approach truth.¹¹

Diversity in values, in communication, in religion, in technology, in everything from politics to poetry, begins to replace uniformity. New institutions, from self-help groups and political splinter organizations to transnational agencies, spring up in the rubble of the democratization. The Western societies are “demassified” as Alvin Toffler predicted for the eighties. The political, economical, and communication networks and bonds since the 1989 revolution developed into a global civilization on a cross-national and non-state base. It was Peter Brook who reminded us about this irresistible movement a year before the wall came down. “The valid truth is the truth of the moment. When many influences interact, through their converging rays, through their friction, a new view can emerge, fresh, surprising....even within a single culture, each individual is conditioned by an ever-wider mixture of global influences. As cultures intermingle, the audience is brought together before precise, yet universal truths.”¹²

It is this challenge which engenders a mutual respect of nations, their progressive cooperation, and their integration with the aim of a common management of problems. But the structure of current relations in Europe and the nature of their resultant problems can only be properly understood against the background of the historic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. Overcoming the factors of uncertainty which existed for decades and

establishing a reliable and sustainable union between East and West does appear to be a real possibility. The challenge for culture today is how to use its anticipatory abilities. The dialectics of European identity shape the emerging outlines of the future.

NOTES:

¹ Vaclav Havel in *Skyline Democracy*, Kyklos, Nicosia, 1990, p. 2.

² Ferdinand Kroh, "Cliques and Old Boy Networks: Power Tension Strategies of the Former East German Elite," in: *Aussenpolitik*, 21/1992, p. 147.

³ *Ibid*, p. 150.

Cf. Benno Zanetti, *Der Weg zur deutschen Einheit*, München, 1991 and Ehrhart Neubert, *Eine protestantische Revolution*, Berlin, 1990.

⁴ Helga Schubert. Magdeburg, 7 February 1993 (tape).

⁵ Wolfgang Schuller, *ibid*.

⁶ Paul Valery, in *Europäische Stimmen*, Bonn, 1963, p.7.

⁷ Peter L. Berger, in *Dialogue*, 2/1984, p. 8.

⁸ K. Michael Prince, "Germany, Europe and the Dilemma of Democratic Legitimation," in *Aussenpolitik*, 1/1995, p. 14.

⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁰ Jacob Burckhardt, *Europäisches Gut*, Wien, 1936, p. 12:

¹¹ Denis de Rougemont, in *Europäische Stimmen*, Berlin, 1990, p. 32.

¹² Peter Brook, "World Theatre Day Message," 27 March 1988 (flyer), US Center of ITI.

The Virgin and the Spirit: A Theological Reflection

The Orthodox feast of the Protection of the Most Holy Mother of God (“Pokrov” in Russian, “Acoperământul Maicii Domnului” – in Romanian) celebrates the power of Theotokos to shadow and preserve the humanity in a state of sacrifice and resurrection. The dignity of the Mother of God sitting on the right side of the heavenly Throne of her Son means both an ocean of love towards humanity and the hymn of praise brought to God by men.

The sacred and divine bond between the Holy Spirit and the Mother of God is obvious in all the history of salvation. Fruit of the blessing of the Comforter, the Virgin, the holy child, was kept in a state of purity and holiness by the Holy Spirit, all her childhood and youth. The state of virginity and continuous prayer is a gift of the Spirit. When the General of the celestial armies, Archangel Gabriel, came to announce her that she will give birth to God, he greets her: “Hail, Mary, full of grace”, showing the divine intimacy between the Virgin Mary and the Holy Spirit. Then, when she asks how it is possible to give birth to a baby from virginity, the archangel answers: “the Holy Spirit will come upon you and the power of the Most High will shadow you”. All her life, the Mother of heavenly love worked the humble joy of the Spirit. She was present at Pentecost, when the Church of Christ, that is His Body, was born in the world, among the Apostles. In this Descent of the Spirit, Christ became interior to every baptized believer in the name of the Most Holy Trinity.

In heaven, at the Throne of the glory of God, the Mother speaks incessantly with the Holy Spirit, imploring him to heal all the

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pain of the world. Every tear of humankind passes through the eyes full of heaven of the Mother of God, and arrives in the heart of the Trinity, where all the tears from all the faces are wiped out.

This holy connection between the Comforter and Theotokos has saving effects in the work of the Son to sanctify the world. The Holy Spirit is the Cover, the Protection of creation from the Genesis: “the Spirit was walking above the waters” (Gen. 1.2), meaning that – in the words of Saint Basil the Great – he was “warming and giving life to the waters, as a hen warming her chicken”. So the Virgin of the tears is a cover and a protection, a shadow of salvation and a support, a loving and life giving warmth for the entire creation.

We say in one of the most common prayers of the Church: “My hope is the Father, my refuge is the Son and my protection is the Holy Spirit, Most Holy Trinity, glory to Thee” (the prayer of Saint Ioanikios). This holy protection is brought by the holy prayers of the Mother of God, through the vigil of the Virgin for the Church.

The Holy Spirit is the Guide of the entire universe toward its vocation in the Kingdom of God. And the Mother of God is the “Hodegetria”, the Directress, the Guide to her Son, listening all the prayers of the world and hiding them in the infinite heart of Christ.

The Holy Spirit is praying for us “with wordless groans” (Romans 8, 26), healing our helplessness, in order to see the heavens of love, and the Mother of God is the incessant suppliant for every and each of us, the heart of a mother at the Throne of the Trinity, healing diseases and listening to the sufferance of the world.

The Holy Spirit is called by Christ himself “the Comforter” (“Parakletos”), the “Episkopos” of the hearts, as in the prayer: “Holy, search – “episkepse” and heal our iniquities, for thy name”, and the Holy Virgin is the comforter to all who are in pain and illnesses.

The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of fruitful virginity, the spring of grace, and the Mother of God is the fruitful Virgin who gave birth to the Son of God, the “full of grace”.

Therefore, the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church and the work of the Mother of God are divinely interconnected and fulfilling themselves. Nobody can receive the Holy Spirit if he (she) doesn't give birth to Christ in his heart, and nobody can give birth to Christ in his heart without the mystical work of the Spirit. Nobody can love the Theotokos without being carried on the wings full of light of the

Spirit. No man or woman can receive the scent of holiness without having a heart of a mother, and no man can carry God in his heart without the tearful prayers of the Virgin.

This is happening because in the heart of the Holy Mother are kept, like in a river bed of light, all the tears of the world, when she saw her Son crucified. All her pain became love full of grace when she saw him resurrected, in the overflow of the Spirit over the history.

The Holy Virgin is a spring of love, because she fulfils in her heart all the painful love of the man undressed of grace and all the longing of God to unite with us. Her mercies flow toward humanity without waiting confirmation, but incessantly flooding the sweetness of love from her motherly heart.

The entire universe, pregnant with God, beholds its mother and learns how to fill itself with the light that rises from the eternal One. The humanity enters the mysteries of history and learns the Eucharistic becoming of matter into energy through grace, as a birth of the kingdom without death.


We see a little virgin and we understand the greatness of the love of God. We look at a woman and we learn the unspeakable wisdom of the Trinity. We see a fragile human being and we understand beyond tears how much a creature can rise through love. We kiss with our soul a baby, and we are disciples at the theological cathedra of the ages. Her silence is more priceless than all the words of this world. For the greatest power of the universe is the life giving love, the self sacrifice. And the greatest light in the world is the power to love an eternity those who killed your baby.

If we are friends of Theotokos all our life, we will find her waiting for us in the heaven, soothing our passage from darkness to light, recognising in our eyes the look of her Son that we wanted and missed all our life.



During the presentations

Group of participants



Left and below:
The “Spiritus” Art Gallery
(Viorica Colpacci)



Elena Mitru and her vestimentary
art exhibition

MAXIM (IULIU-MARIUS) MORARIU

Imaginea părintelui Dumitru Stăniloae în viziunea Sandei Stolojan/ The Image of Father Dumitru Stăniloae in the Vision of Sanda Stolojan

Abstract. In this research paper, the author tries to explore how the image of father Dumitru Stăniloae is reflected in the *Diary of Paris exile* of the Romanian writer Sanda Stolojan, who was an important personality of the Romanian exile in France, with connections to personalities like Emil Cioran (whose work *Tears and Saints* she translated into French), Monica Lovinescu, Virgil Ierunca, Vintilă Horia or Paul Goma, nephew of the famous Romanian writer Duiliu Zamfirescu. She emigrated in 1961 and established herself in Paris, where she worked as a translator for important personalities like the President of France, Charles de Gaulle. In the same time she was an active supporter of Romanians persecuted for political reasons, as the president of the *League for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania* from Paris, between 1984 and 1991, and a well known author of articles in journals like: *Journal de Geneve*, *Esprit*, *Cahiers de L'Est* (that she founded), *Le Monde*, *L'Alternative*, *Lettre Internationale*, or *ARA Journal*. She also wrote and published diaries and memories.

In one of these, the Parisian journal (*Diary of Paris exile*) she evokes some meetings with Father Dumitru Stăniloae, an outstanding theologian and orthodox spiritual personality of Romania during the communist period. We will try to present here these evocations and to show how she sees the Romanian theologian. We will also

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emphasize the way in which the discourse and the ideas of Fr. Stăniloae were influenced by the fact that he was persecuted and imprisoned by the communist terror regime in Romania under Ceaușescu and his wife Elena. The work will bring to attention an image of the renowned Romanian theologian that is different from the one with whom theological circles have accustomed readers and will focus on his influence on the secular intellectual Romanian diaspora in France.

Keywords: Romanian exile in France, anticommunism, resistance, Saint Serge Institute, theology, *Dogmatics*.

Într-un text publicat în numerele anterioare ale revistei *Symposium*¹, protestam împotriva faptului că părintele Stăniloae a fost de-a dreptul confiscat de cercetarea teologică. Cei care scriu despre el sunt cu precădere oameni din spațiul mai sus-pomenit. Ei valorifică cu precădere aspecte privitoare la opera sa de specialitate și publică texte ce se adresează unui segment specializat de cititori. În plus, aproape că omit latura umană și capacitatea de a interacționa cu intelectualii și alți exponenți ai spațiului laic, a marelui teolog român.

Pledam atunci pentru redescoperirea modului în care imaginea lui este creionată în paginile unor jurnale, memorii, evocări sau articole redactate de oameni care au interacționat puțin cu spațiul și mediul teologic. Am oferit atunci ca exemplu evocările Monicăi Lovinescu, arătând că în paginile lor pot fi regăsite considerații interesante atât cu privire la biografia, cât și la opera marelui părinte.

În continuarea acestui demers, propun în aceste rânduri readucerea în atenție a modului în care este descris părintele Stăniloae în însemnările Sandei Stolojan (1919-2005). Nepoată a lui Duiliu Zamfirescu, absolventă a Facultății de Litere din București, ea va fi o personalitate importantă a exilului românesc. Traducătoare prolifică², poetă, scriitoare de roman³ sau editoare de corespondență⁴ fondatoare de revistă, autoare a unor opere interesante, prezentă în paginile operelor de referință dedicate fie exilului românesc, fie culturii feminine românești,⁵ ea va rămâne în istorie nu atât pentru publicistica ce-i poartă semnătura, cât mai ales pentru relațiile pe care le va avea cu nume de seamă ale exilului parizian și nu numai, precum Emil Cioran,⁶ Monica Lovinescu, Vintilă Horea, Paul Goma etc. Va fi, într-un fel, omul de casă al familiei Lovinescu-Ierunca, fapt ce

explică recurențele referiri la numele ei în paginile jurnalelor celor doi soți.⁷ Cioran, căruia îi va traduce în limba franceză volumul *Lacrimi și sfinți*,⁸ i se va confesa adeseori, după cum reiese din paginile memoriilor ei⁹, la fel ca și soții mai sus pomeniți în vreme ce, cu alte nume importante ale românismului din spațiul francez, se va întâlni și va interacționa regulat.

În plus, se va remarca prin activitatea de militant, fiind președintele *Ligii pentru Apărarea Drepturilor Omului în România* de la Paris, între anii 1984-1991¹⁰ și cea de publicist, fiind colaboratoarea unor reviste precum: *Limite*, *Ethos*, *Fiinta romaneasca*, *Revista scriitorilor romani*; *Journal de Geneve*, *Esprit*, *Cahiers de L'Est* (pe care a și înființat-o), *Le Monde*, *L'Alternative*, *Lettre Internationale*, sau *ARA Journal* etc.¹¹

Interacțiunile cu ei sau activitatea de interpret a unor diplomați importanți sau a unor oameni de prim rang ai lumii politice franceze, marcată de evenimente importante, la fel ca și alte aspecte ale vieții cotidiene, vor constitui subiectele însemnărilor zilnice din paginile unor jurnale sau conținutul memoriilor. De altfel, la acest segment, Sanda Stolojan se va remarca prin consecvență scriitoricească, publicând mai multe volume ce pot fi subsumate acestei categorii.¹² Apărute inițial în limba franceză, ele vor fi traduse după anul 1989 și în limba română și vor fi bine primite de către publicul cititor. Locul ei în mișcarea de rezistență a exilului românesc este însă, în ciuda anilor scurși deja de la evenimentele petrecute în anul 1989, doar parțial recunoscut, poate și din pricina discreției care i-a marcat întreaga biografie.

Între personalitățile pe care le evocă în paginile însemnărilor ei, se numără și teologul pomenit, asupra căruia ne-am propus să ne oprim în paginile cercetării de față. Spre deosebire de Monica Lovinescu, care are mai multe interacțiuni cu părintele Stăniloae și ține să prezinte în paginile ei și anumite constatări cu privire la opera lui,¹³ creionându-i o imagine pozitivă, dar care nu este lipsită de anumite critici referitoare la opera lui, scriitoarea de față nu prezintă decât două scurte descrieri ale întâlnirilor pe care le-a avut cu el, reliefându-i pe de-o parte preocupările și grijile, pe de alta bucuriile și prezentând aspecte privitoare la modul său de a gândi și de a înțelege lumea.

Evocările ei sunt importante atât din motivele enunțate mai sus, cât și pentru că ne prezintă un teolog cu o imagine ușor diferită de cea cu care ne-am obișnuit. Dacă în paginile tratatelor de teologie sau ale traducerilor, amprenta personală transpare mai degrabă la nivel stilistic, în cazul traducerilor, sau din modul în care interpretează anumite pasaje din operele Sfinților Părinți, aducându-le în actualitate, acestea nereliefând preocupările lui interioare privitoare la viața de zi cu zi, în descrierile Sandei Stolojan, lucrurile sunt ușor diferite.

Vizibil marcat de teroarea ce domnea în spațiul românesc și se manifesta cu precădere asupra libertății de exprimare, dânsul va fi destul de timorat în interacțiunea cu scriitoarea. Cu toate acestea, va demonstra că presiunile la care a fost supus în țară nu l-au făcut să-și piardă capacitatea de a gândi normal, de a avea opinii și de a evalua în mod obiectiv anumite situații. Discuțiile lui cu Sanda Stolojan dovedesc acest lucru. În plus, între cei doi interlocutori domnește o atmosferă prietenoasă. Amprenta pe care teologul român o lasă asupra scriitoarei este și ea una puternică. Vădit impresionată de prezența și anvergura lui duhovnicească și culturală, ea îl va descrie în tușe foarte pozitive. Prima întâlnire evocată în paginile jurnalului parizian se va petrece în data de 26 mai 1976. În prezentarea scurtă și concentrată a ei, se va limita la a descrie principalele frământări ale interlocutorului, care vor fi dublate de propria percepție a autoarei cu privire la el. Iată cum arată descrierea acestei întâlniri în paginile operei pomenite:

„26 mai (1976)

Părintele Stăniloae mi-a dat întâlnire pe o bancă din fața bisericii ruse de pe strada Daru. Îl găsesc preocupat de venirea fiicei sale în Franța și de traducerea ultimelor sale cărți la Paris (un *Tratat de Mistică*¹⁴ și o *Dogmatică*¹⁵). Sunt sedusă de stilul omului. Văd în părintele Stăniloae ceea ce spiritul ortodox a produs mai elevat: rigoarea judecății combinată cu bunătatea inimii reprezintă în ochii mei umanismul creștin în versiunea lui orientală cea mai nobilă. Contactul cu această formă de spirit îmi dă un fel de jubilarie interioară. Ne vom întâlni la toamnă la Congresul organizat de ortodocșii francezi la Amiens”¹⁶

Din nefericire, întâlnirea petrecută la congresul ortodox de la Amiens nu se va regăsi între însemnările scriitoarei. Preocupată de descrierea unor fenomene precum conflictul dintre Virgil Gheorghiu

și Monica Lovinescu, cazul Goma¹⁷ sau alte chestiuni similare, ea va prefera să le immortalizeze pe acestea în paginile însemnărilor ei, în locul evenimentului religios. Așa se face că, următoarea evocare a părintelui Stăniloae în paginile jurnalului parizian al Sandei Stolojan se va petrece abia în anul 1981, când acesta se va afla la Paris pentru a primi titlul de *doctor honoris causa* al Institutului Saint Serge, fondat de teologii Ortodocși ruși din exil în Paris.¹⁸ Textul ei seamănă izbitor de mult cu evocarea dedicată întâlnirii prilejuite de același episod de către Monica Lovinescu,¹⁹ care preia însemnarea în două dintre jurnalele sale.²⁰ De această dată, descrierea este mai amplă iar atenția scriitoarei nu este focalizată doar asupra personalității celui cu care interacționează, ci și asupra locului în care este găzduit, asupra operei, a politicii religioase și teologice internaționale și a politicii românești:

„iunie (1981)

Mă duc să-l văd pe părintele Stăniloae la Saint-Serge, unde locuiește într-o cameră de student. Se află la Paris de câteva zile. Nimeni n-a știut că va primi titlul de "doctor honoris causa", nici un român n-a fost de față la ceremonie. După părerea lui Olivier Clement, care a ținut o frumoasă cuvântare, rușii de la Saint-Serge nu sunt prea încântați, dat fiind ambiția rusească de-a fi în materie de ortodoxie cei dintâi, dar sunt obligați să se încline în fața lui Stăniloae și în fața unui teolog ca Olivier Clement. Mai e ceva: teama de a dispăcea Patriarhiei din București, de vreme ce singurii prezenți erau celălalt preot român și episcopul, numiți de București la Paris. Părintele Stăniloae mi-a vorbit despre lucrările lui: *Dogmatica*, acum tradusă în toate marile limbi, volumul X din *Filocalie*, publicat de Olivier Clement la editorul Desclees, și o carte despre iubire publicată în Elveția.

Despre situația din România spune că niciodată n-a fost atât de umilit poporul român ca acum. A vorbit cu scârbă și despre cultul personalității lui Ceaușescu, de caracterul diabolic al sistemului care-l apără. Nu se poate apropia nimeni de el. E înconjurat de o pază extraordinară. În posturile supreme a pus numai rude și oameni apropiați. Până și Securitatea, zice părintele Stăniloae, s-ar fi săturat de regim. Pe urmă, mizeria, cozile, lipsurile – la sate mai ales. Părintele Stăniloae mi-a făcut aceeași impresie de curaj și autenticitate ca altădată. O judecată fără greș, o înțelepciune trecută

printr-o minte *tradițională*, capabilă să fie în același timp de mare actualitate".²¹

După ce descrie succint detaliile spațiale ale întâlnirii și fericitul eveniment căruia teologul român îi este protagonist, care îi generează însă stări de angoasă din pricina faptului de a fi fost unul fortuit (fapt ce ar putea da emoții Securității de la București, obsedată cu supravegherea îndeaproape a celor care părăseau țara, dar și mediului teologic, afectând contextul unei politici bisericești și așa destul de fragile), ea descrie în mod cronologic evoluția dialogului avut cu el. Vorbește despre modul în care i-a descris teologul bucuria pricinuită de traducerea *Dogmaticii* sau publicarea unor alte volume (volumul X din *Filocalie* și un volum despre iubire apărut în Elveția),²² și relația lui cu Olivier Clement, pe atunci personalitate importantă a Institutului pomenit. Apoi, în cea de-a doua parte a conversației, părintele îi oferă interlocutoarei sale o descriere detaliată a situației României din ultima parte a comunismului, evidențiind probleme precum nepotismul, sărăcia, mizeriile și cozile. Descrierea lui o face pe scriitoare să își sporească admirația atât față de personajul pe care îl are în față, cât și față de modul clar și coerent de a vedea și înțelege lucrurile.

Ultima parte a discuției celor doi relevă mai multe lucruri. Pe de-o parte, ea arată că relațiile dintre scriitoare și teologul român deveniseră foarte cordiale, iar raportul de încredere pe care părintele îl avea în ea, era unul foarte ridicat. În alte condiții, el nu și-ar fi permis cu certitudine să-i împărtășească atât de detaliat situația din România și să-i descrie într-o manieră atât de amănunțită nu doar chestiuni privitoare la viața cotidiană și socială de aici, ci și elemente privitoare la cea politică. Apoi, faptul că aceasta a notat această convorbire în paginile jurnalului ei, într-o vreme în care exponenții de seamă ai exilului erau supravegheați, Securitatea încercând prin toate mijloacele fie cooptarea lor în rândurile colaboratorilor, fie intimidarea lor, spune și el multe lucruri. Ne arată că nu se mai simțea atât de amenințată de repetatele supravegheri și că-și permitea să-și noteze fără a se cenzura în nici un fel și fără a face o selecție a informațiilor bazându-se pe riscul la care i-ar expune pe cei evocați în jurnal în cazul unei descoperiri a acestuia de către oamenii puterii din spațiul românesc.

Datorită acestor note, aspecte interesante privitoare la părintele Dumitru Stăniloae, care ar fi rămas altminteri cu certitudine inedite, sunt prezentate în paginile jurnalului parizian al Sandei Stolojan. Gândurile ei așternute în scris sunt importante atât datorită veridicității informațiilor pe care le oferă, cât și pentru faptul că prezintă un altfel de părinte Stăniloae, mai apreciat în Occident decât acasă, modest și onest, speriat din mai multe motive de gândul succesului, care, în ciuda tuturor experiențelor care l-au marcat, reușește încă să se mențină liber la nivelul rațiunii și este capabil de o evaluare obiectivă a situației românești, denotând și la acest nivel o inteligență și capacitate de înțelegere aparte.

NOTES:

- ¹ Maxim (Iuliu-Marius) Morariu, “Părintele Dumitru Stăniloae în viziunea Monicăi Lovinescu,” în *Symposium*, nr. XXIV – “Knowledge and Enchantment: A World without Mystery? The Twenty-fourth Ecumenical Theological and Interdisciplinary Symposium,” New York, 2017, pp. 49-58.
- ² Ofelia M. Uță Burcea, “El exilio español (1939-1989). Actitudes y relaciones entre los intelectuales rumanos,” în *Philologica Jassyensia*, XII (2016), no. 2, p. 308.
- ³ Autoarea unor volume precum: Sanda Stolojan, *Maison pour un mirage*, col. “Terre d’encre,” Les Éditions du Laquet, Martel, 2003; Sanda Stolojan, *Avec de Gaulle en Roumanie*, col. “Mémorables,” L’Herne, Paris, 1991; Sanda Stolojan, *Cu de Gaulle în România: în anexa textul inedit al convorbirii dintre de Gaulle și Ceaușescu din 14 mai 1994*, Editura Albatros, București, 1994; Sanda Stolojan, *Duiliu Zamfirescu*, col. “Twayne’s World Authors Series,” vol. 551, New York, Twaine, 1980.
- ⁴ Sanda Stolojan, *Sub semnul depărtării corespondența Constantin Noica - Sanda Stolojan*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2006.
- ⁵ Precum: George Marcu (coord.), *Dicționarul personalităților feminine din România*, Editura Meronia, București, 2009; Daniel Florin Predoiu, *S’initier à l’errance en la racontant: l’exil, l’identité et la mémoire dans les journaux intimes de trois intellectuels roumains*, Éditions Universitaires Européennes, Saarbrücken, 2011.

⁶ Cf. Marta Petreu, *Despre bolile filosofilor – Cioran*, ediția a 3-a, col. "Eseu," Editura Polirom, Iași, 2017.

⁷ Cf. Virgil Ierunca, *Trecut-au anii... fragmente de jurnal, întâmpimări și accente, scrisori nepierdute*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2000; Monica Lovinescu, *La apa Vavilonului*, col. "Memorii-Jurnale-Convorbiri," Editura Humanitas, 1999.

⁸ Emil Cioran, *Des larmes et des saints*, trad. Sanda Stolojan, Editions de l'Herne, Paris, 1986.

⁹ Iată un astfel de exemplu: 26 mai (1976)

"I-am făcut o vizită lui Cioran. Mă aștepta cu o tavă de brânzeturi și fructe. Avea chef de vorbă, îi place să readucă pe tapet vechile povești românești, deși pretinde că s-a detașat complet de ele. I-am spus că ascultasem în ajun interviul lui Const. Virgil Gheorghiu cu o romancieră în vogă și că jucase rolul sfântului, mai ipocrit ca niciodată. Cioran s-a strâmbat îngrozitor, imitându-l pe Virgil Gheorghiu, cu surâsul lui infect și accentul său îngrozitor. "E leit Smerdiakov", zice el. Cioran îl cunoaște bine pe C. V. Gheorghiu și este la curent cu povestea succesului *Orei 25*. Cioran n-a uitat niciodată triumful lui Virgil Gheorghiu, dar adaugă că personajul a trădat pe toată lumea, este infam. Lingușelile sale sunt nerușinate. A fost pierdut pentru literatură în urma scandalului care a urmat *Orei 25*, scandal declanșat de Ierunca, teleghidat de Mircea Eliade, gelos pe succesul romanului, dixit Cioran. Dar C. V. Gh. are la ora actuală un public pentru romanele sale. Explicația cazului Gheorghiu? Are un real talent de barbar care îi distrează pe civilizații oboșiți și vlăguți de orice vitalitate. Cioran îl crede și cam smintit. Este mai ales odios, am adăugat eu, fiindcă se servește de religie pentru a-și face publicitate". Sanda Stolojan, *Nori peste balcoane. Jurnal din exilul parizian*, trad. din franceză de Micaela Slăvescu, revizuită de Sanda Stolojan, col. "Memorii – jurnale," Editura Humanitas, București, 1996, pp. 22-23.

¹⁰ <http://www.humanitas.ro/sanda-stolojan>, accesat 12. 01. 2018.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² Sanda Stolojan, *Să nu plecăm toți odată: amintiri din România anilor '50*, col. "Memorii, jurnale," Editura Humanitas, București, 2009; Sanda Stolojan, *Au balcon de l'exil roumain à Paris. Avec Cioran, Eugène Ionesco, Mircea Eliade, Vintila Horia...*, col. "Aujourd'hui l'Europe," Editions L'Harmattan, Paris, 1999; Sanda Stolojan, *Amurg senin: jurnal din exilul parizian: 1997-2001*, col. "Memorii, jurnale," trad. Dana Petrișor, Editura Humanitas, București, 2007.

¹³ Monica Lovinescu, *Jurnal (1981-1984)*, ediția a II-a revăzută, col. "Memorii – jurnale – convorbiri," Editura Humanitas, București, 2003, p. 78.

- ¹⁴ Este vorba despre o ediție mai veche a volumului: Dumitru Stăniloae, *Ascetica și Mistica Bisericii Ortodoxe*, col. "Scrieri," vol. 1, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 2002.
- ¹⁵ Este vorba despre primul volum al *Teologiei Dogmatice* a părintelui. A se vedea: Dumitru Stăniloae, *Teologia dogmatică ortodoxă*, vol. 1, ediția a 2-a, col. "Biblioteca teologică. Teologi ortodocși români," Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1996. De altfel, acest volum va fi, la scurtă vreme după publicarea în spațiul francez, intens mediatizat în paginile periodicului *Irenikon* al abăției de la Chevegtone, de către un ucenic al părintelui, pe atunci profesor la Institutul Ecumenic de la Bossey, devenit între timp cel de-al cincilea Patriarh al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române. Vezi: Dan I. Ciobotea, "Une dogmatique pour l'homme d'aujourd'hui," în *Irenikon*, LIV (1981), no. 4, p. 472-482
- ¹⁶ Sanda Stolojan, *Nori peste balcoane. Jurnal din exilul parizian*, p. 41.
- ¹⁷ Iată, de exemplu, ce va scrie cu privire la aceste subiecte în 1981: "Mare fierbere în exilul românesc de la Paris. Paul Goma a primit un pachet-capcană, de asemenea și fostul ministru țărănist, Nicolae Penescu. Au primit fiecare câte un pachet de cărți conținând o bombă, pe care poliția a dezamorsat-o, dar care l-a rănit totuși pe Penescu la față. Legătura dintre cele două și recenta conferință de la Madrid era evidentă. Amândoi se duseseră la Madrid pentru a denunța regimul de la București. Din culisele exilului a răsărit spectrul spaimii. Unii au început să răspândească vorbe calomnioase, cum că Paul Goma și cei care-l susțin ar fi în realitate agenți ai KGB-ului. Const. Virgil Gheorghiu, preot, dar fățarnic din cap până în picioare, a dat un interviu în *Figaro*, unde ne caracteriza drept "agenți tulburi." Am aflat de la DST că ordinul de trimitere a pachetelor-capcană fusese dat de Ceaușescu în persoană, cu scopul de a-i intimida pe refugiații care-i strică politica. Îmi jurasem să nu mă mai las antrenată, să rezist la reacțiile colective. Dar solidaritatea și indignarea m-au împins să scriu o scrisoare la *Figaro*. Nici o reacție. Am trimis un articol la revista *Esprit* pentru a protesta împotriva acuzațiilor insidioase ale lui C. Virgil Gheorghiu (căruia *Figaro* i-a oferit o tribună). *Esprit* mi-a publicat articolul. De n-ar fi prezența reală a teroriștilor veniți din Est, care ne dau târcoale, toată această agitație ar avea un caracter derizoriu care nu-mi scapă. Povestea pare absurdă, dar experiența ne-a învățat că prezența agenților poliției secrete a lui Ceaușescu la Paris nu este o fantasmă. Dimpotrivă. Iată ce explicam deunăzi unei persoane care mă întreba ce căutăm în toate aceste acțiuni (manifestații, drepturi ale omului, proteste etc.). Am răspuns: adevărat, Exilul este înainte de toate o experiență *personală*, dar o experiență pe care așa de mulți au trăit-o încât o poți

considera ca o dramă colectivă care te provoacă, te obligă să reacționezi”.
Ibidem, pp. 104-105.

¹⁸ Pentru mai multe informații cu privire la acest episod, a se vedea și: <http://basilica.ro/16-noiembrie-1903-111-ani-de-la-nasterea-parintelui-dumitru-staniloae/>, accesat 12. 01. 2018; http://www.spiritualite-orthodoxe.net/dumitru_staniloae_theologie_orthodoxe.html, accesat 12. 01. 2018; Victor Botez, “Dumitru Stăniloae. A missionary of sacredness,” în *Analele Academiei Oamenilor de Știință din România – Series on Philosophy, Psychology and Theology*, XV (2013), no. 1-2, pp. 42-74.

¹⁹ Aceasta notează următoarele: “Sâmbătă, 10 Octombrie (1981) După amiaza – Părintele Stăniloae cu fiica lui. A ținut să ne aducă ultima lui carte și a avut curajul să scrie o dedicație (nu toți îl au). Parcă visez la un alt timp, în care l-aș fi putut avea aproape și aș fi învățat și eu ceva din ortodoxie și despre Dumnezeu.

Mare căldură, pace – amară - (timpul i se pare a merge spre sfârșitul lui), o umilință cinstită (ne-excluzând sentimentul valorii sale). Cuvinte simple, de toate zilele. Nici o emfază, nici o retorică. Prin Nicu Steinhardt (și poate altădată Yvonne Rosignon), aș fi putut că cred. P. St. m-ar fi putut învăța ce e credința.” Monica Lovinescu, *Jurnal (1981-1984)*, p. 23.

²⁰ Monica Lovinescu, *Jurnal esențial*, ed. Cristina Cioabă, col. “Zetgeist”, Editura Humanitas, București, 2010, pp. 25-26.

²¹ Sanda Stolojan, *Nori peste balcoane. Jurnal din exilul parizian*, p. 110-111.

²² Al cărui titlu nu am reușit să îl identificăm însă, căci volumul *Sfânta Treime sau la început a fost iubirea* (Dumitru Stăniloae, *Sfânta Treime sau La început a fost iubirea*, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1993), despre care bănuiam că ar putea fi vorba, a fost publicat abia postum și deci, nu se punea problema unei traduceri.

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
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Richard Grallo (left) and
Louis Tietje



Academic discussions



Richard Grallo (left),
Alina Feld and Louis Tietje



Doru Tsaganea (left) and
Theodor Damian



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