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Nation and Identity: Reconciling the Traditional Sense of Belonging with the Globalist Tendencies of Current Post-Culturalism

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
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Time and Transcendence: Ethical Values in Theological Perspective

> "If time had had leaves, what an autumn!"
> [Dacă timpul ar fi avut frunze, /Ce toamnă!]
> *Nichita Stanescu*

Definitions

Even though Albert Einstein said that time is an obstinate illusion,[1] other definitions place it in the domain of reality. According to Webster's Dictionary time is "a non-spatial continuum in which events occur in apparently irreversible succession from the past through the present to the future." It is "an interval separating two points on a continuum measured essentially by selecting a regularly occurring event."

Somehow, in similar terms, but leading in a different direction, theologian Dumitru Staniloae defines time "as a duration which is always interval, or the movement in the interval between two ends of a bridge"[2] Time is generally connected to the physical dimension of the universe, it is "an objective form of the material existence,[3] or, more metaphysically speaking, a dimension of existence, or existence itself. This last understanding underlines the ontological character of time. Eliminate the existent and there is no more time. Other philosophers speak of this character of time in a more explicative way. For instance, Robert J. Spitzer believes that time (just like space) is not a passive dimension but, as recently understood, "produces concrete effects on the emission and

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interaction of various forms of energy, which some philosophers call the 'ontological' status of time."[4]

The active dimension of time can be illustrated by the connection that some scientists see between it and the genome. "Time exists only because the genome exists," Alexandru Mironov writes, "the double spiral of the DNA, present in each cell of each observer [person], but also, probably, in all cells of all chlorophyll and protoplasm construction in the metagalaxy we live in."[5]

Moreover, time should not be considered as separate from space and maybe other dimensions of the universe. Celebrated Russian physicist Andrei Linde came up with the idea that the universe has not only two fundamental components: time and space, but also a third one: conscience.[6]

This idea leads directly to the theology of the 7th century thinker Maximus the Confessor according to whom everything in the created order has a certain type of rationality of its own, called in Greek *logoi*, and which is the logical deduction of the fact that, based on John's prologue to his Gospel, everything came into being at the intervention of the divine Logos. In Greek *logos* means both word and reason. This teaching is not far from that of Heraclitus of Ephesus who, five centuries before John, considered the Logos (a cosmic rational power for him) responsible for the movement of atoms (and change) in the universe and thus for the formation of the physical shapes and bodies. But if we speak of reason and conscience we come to the realm of rational beings, of persons. In this sense, from a theological perspective, according to D. Staniloae, time, like space, indicates an interpersonal relation and this is where the highest value of it can be found. Speaking from a horizontal point of view time distinguishes and unites us as well. It is the interval that links us and keeps us apart. We can reduce the interval, make it wider, or overcome it.[7] Speaking from a vertical point of view time connects us and the created order to the eternal God in a dynamic relationship[8] meant to bring man forever into the divine communion. In other words, time is the duration between God's offering and man's response.[9]

A totally different way in which one can explore the meaning of time is etymology. The word comes from the Latin *tempus*. Yet *tempus* comes from an ancient Greek, maybe Pelasgian, verb, *temno-*

tempo which means to cut. To cut is to measure, but also to stop (as one is doing busy work) and look, see, understand, contemplate.[10]

But *temno-tempo* can be also the etymon for *templum* and hence, contemplation. If *templum* then has this connotation: cut, stop, see, realize understand, that means basically that when you are in such a state, you are in a sacred place where you are supposed not only to cut, stop (busy work) in order to see (God) beyond appearances, but even to become a seer, -- and this is what contemplation essentially is – to become, in a sense, like God, the seer par excellence (in Greek, the word God, *Theos* comes from the verb *theastai,* to see). Hence God is the seer of everything and thus knows everything and has power over everything. According to distinguished historian and philosopher of religions, Mircea Eliade, while the temple, *templum* is a special symbol which represents the horizontal dimension of the universe, and the year is the temporal symbol which represents the vertical dimension of the universe, *templum,* however, also has a vertical dimension since it is the means and the way toward one's own transcendence.[11]

Contemplation then has a deep theological meaning having to do with moving from one type of existence, busy work, to a different one, from superficiality to the essence and depth of things, from the profane to the sacred, thus advancing one on the inner journey to God.

Eternity as Transcendence of Time

As A. von Heuer writes, there is a bit of eternity everywhere.[12] If time gives us a taste of the provisional, this implicitly signals that there is a taste of the eternal, too. Emil Cioran's book *The Fall into Time* also suggests that the fall cannot be but from eternity.

If time has in it a bit of eternity this must be understood not in the sense that time engenders eternity but the other way around. Just like the finite has in it the seed, the reflection of the infinite, just like everything in creation that came into being through the eternal, divine Logos bears the mark of the Logos deep down in its core, so it is with time and eternity. In other words, just like every contingent thing in the created order has as its core a transcendent reality, or like the transcendent is hidden in the immanent, so is eternity hidden in time, eternity being the transcendent dimension that gives existence and meaning to whatever it engenders, including time.

According to D. Staniloae, there is an eternity before time and another one after time. Time is different from eternity, yet eternity explains time because it originates in it and has its end in it, and thus "eternity is time's foundation."[13] Eternity is as much in time as it is above it.[14]

Maximus the confessor has a different explanation when it comes to the relation between time and what is above it. "When it ceases its motion time is aeon, and when the aeon is measured, it is time carried by motion. Aeon is time without movement and time is aeon measured through movement."[15] If the aeon is understood to be the eternal, it is important to know that what makes the difference between them is motion and measure, yet whatever the difference is for as long as there is a fulfillment into something else, time is subject to becoming or is itself becoming.

Presenting Arthur Pontynen and Rod Miller's book *Western Culture at the American Crossroads: Conflicts over the Nature of Science and Reason,* Joshua A. Reichard writes that "the temporal must find completion in the eternal," just like "becoming must be grounded in Being" and *"scientia* must ultimately lead to sapientia.*"*[16] This understanding leads already to the field of ethics. The relation between time and eternity can be stated as the relation between Chronos and Kairos.

Chronos is becoming, it is program, schedule, occupation, division, fragmentation, and one can also say, wasting, loss. Kairos is being, it is the appropriate moment, concentration, contemplation, gathering, fulfillment, overflowing, continuation, permanence, durability.[17] There is no incompatibility between Chronos and Kairos, however different from one another they might be.

If Reichard talks about time and eternity, becoming and being, *scientia* and *sapientia,* then all, time, becoming and ultimately man, are capable of eternity: *Tempus capax infiniti,* just as *homo capax infiniti.* On the human plane, when man is capable of contemplation and does it, he or she "sees", realizes, the eternal element in time, the presence of the Kairos in Chronos, and thus, living in both, not in one only, achieves spiritual equilibrium.

This is how one experiences transcendence, which confirms what James L. Kugel wrote, that transcendence is a reality accessible within the humans self.[18]

It is important to note here that even if we speak of man's becoming, time (even when understood as becoming) does not belong to man's being or to that of the created order, "because in the life to come time is no longer experienced in its unfolding."[19]

The Meaning of Time

When it comes to man and ethics, one important question has to be asked: What is the meaning of time? And another, related one: What do we do with our time?

The first question brings us to the issue of the *Zeitgeist:* the spirit of time. This is a multi-directional exploration because one can think of the spirit of time as opposed to "the letter of time," like sense, meaning, value versus formalism, legalism and political correctness understood in many ways, one can think of Zeitgeist in the sense of the general mood, fashion, direction visible in a certain society in any given period of time, and also, one can think of God's presence in the dimension we call time or of time as a divine gift and then of what the divine purpose with the gift is when offered to the receiver.

From a theological perspective time represents the growth, evolution, development of the divine creation, of each thing towards the fulfillment of the purpose it was created for. Consequently, when it comes to us and the meaning of time, the problem posed is about discovering, realizing, understanding the divine purpose in creation, just like one tries to detect one's vocation in life so that one can advance towards what one is "made for." To find one's vocation and follow it means to fulfill one's destiny by also advancing towards one's destination. This is how one finds meaning in what one does and in how one lives, not only for oneself, but implicitly and imperatively for others as well.

That is why, when I understand the purpose of time, and that is part of the zeitgeist, like with the purpose of any other thing, and use it accordingly (as when I get a machine and use it according to the instructions and not otherwise), what I do with it goes beyond it, beyond time, in this case, and reverberates into eternity, or as Joshua A. Reichard, again, wrote, "the temporal must find completion in the eternal." That is so because completion, fulfillment, is found only when you are in communion with the person, place, you belong to.

Everything is about belonging, purpose, meaning, and fulfillment. But the phenomenology of belonging implies going out and coming back, that is procession and return. In the words of Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, procession and return implies "flowing out from the Good onto all that is, and returning once again to the Good. In this, divine yearning shows especially its beginning and unending nature travelling in an endless circle through the Good, from the Good, in the Good and to the Good, unerringly turning, even on the same center, ever in the same direction, always proceeding, always remaining and always being restored to itself.[20]

Speaking of belonging which implies return, Mircea Eliade writes about the profane and the sacred dimensions of time and of man's need to revalorize the time as eternity which can be done by one's exit from the irreality of the profane, temporal existence and coming into the realm of the real, of the sacred where one belongs. This spiritual itinerary towards the origins can be achieved only by resacralizing the profane.[21] So time is there in man's life in order to help him or her transcend it as one transcends the interval, not to escape from it. This is how eternity is to be achieved.[22]

The meaning of time then, since time is ontologically related to existence, consists of its sacred core which is there for it to be seen and used by man in order to go back "home," to his or her authentic place and nature, like the prodigal son who, being "out of himself" in the foreign country, and miserable, suddenly "came back into himself", into his own original nature and returned home and was restored in the initial position.

Man thus needs to see and understand and do something about his or her own existence. Pico della Mirandola says that beautifully: "We have given you, oh Adam, no visage proper to yourself, nor any endowment properly your own, in order that whatever place, whatever form, whatever gifts you may with premeditation select, these same you may have and possess through your own judgment and decision. The nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may by your own free will, to whose custody We have assigned you, trace yourself the lineaments of your own nature. I have placed you at the very center of the world, so that from that vantage point you may with greater ease glance round about you on all that the world contains. We have made you a

creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer."[23]

One needs to notice here how man's time and that of the created order interpenetrate each other, which means the created order is there to help man regain his or her original status and man has an obligation to care, honor and sanctify the created order, both, based on man's capacity to discover the authentic meaning everywhere, and on his or her responsibility to act accordingly.

In other words between my time and the time of all other things there is a perichoretical relation, like the dance of the sub-particles of matter around their centers and each one around the other, a dance without which the world would not exist. That is why what I do with my time, like in the theory of systems, affects the whole creation whether I realize it or not. Hence the cosmic responsibility that each person has for the entire world, for all people. It is not that the world is responsible for man but vice versa, that is why the fall of man from God's face led to the fall of the created order, for which creation is in pain as St. Paul put it: "For we know that up to the present time all of creation groans with pain, like the pain of childbirth" (Romans 8, 22).

This indicates that "time is not meant to remain exterior to the creature, but, from the outset, becomes the condition of its ascent" and that the created order "has been made to transcend movement and time."[24]

On the other hand my time is mine and it is not. Time was given to me. Like life, like the world. I did not create them. They are gifts. Consequently what I do with what was given to me must start from and lead to the right attitude I adopt towards the giver, in the sense that I need to make sure that what I do with what was given to me will be circumscribed to the purpose the giver had in mind with both the gift and the act of giving. As D. Staniloae writes, "God's eternity is present in the time of man through the offer of His love which provokes and helps man to respond."[25] This is why we can think that we are, and we are not masters of what we say or pretend is ours, because, in fact, nothing is ours, totally and definitively. We are rather temporal administrators of the received gifts with the obligation to use them according to what is imbedded in their nature and to the intention of the giver.

Also, when we think of the nature of the gift, we realize that part of this nature is for the gift to be circulated, shared.

The gift is meant to be communion, eucharist. You have received, you give. This is where your link with the other is your positive work and attitude *coram mundo.*

This is the way in which one becomes, according to the nice expression of Ramin Jahanbegloo, "a friend of one's time."[26]

Transcendence and Ethics

Transcendence is becoming once again a topic of interest in philosophy and science (see for instance Charles Landesman's book *Leibniz's Mill: A Challenge to Materialism,* Robert J. Spitzer's *New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of Contemporary Physics and Philosophy,* David Hopper's work *Divine Transcendence and the Culture of Change,* Frank Tippler's *The Physics of Immortality,* and others), and, as Jesse J. Thomas indicates, contemporary philosophers of science seek "to restore transcendence to its proper ethical and philosophical-theological place."[27]

Yet while transcendence seems to be a vague and abstract topic, some authors have a more concrete, "tangible" understanding of it. By relating it to personal subjectivity these authors make transcendence somehow more approachable and directly connected to the field of Ethics. This is how D. Staniloae explains it: "Genuine eternity must be the quality of a perfect subjectivity, for only this is wholly incorruptible and possesses the most essential dimensions of inexhaustibility and infinite freshness of manifestation, namely interiority and free will. Only the subject is totally without composition, inexhaustible in its possibilities and free."[28]

The idea of perfect subjectivity as something which cannot be achieved in this temporary existence is expressed by R. Kendall Soulen in a different way. "Human self," he says, "is grounded in a transcendent reality because it revolves around something greater than itself."[29] If it revolves around something greater, that might indicate dependence, but also belonging. Thus the imperfect subject is a reflection, an image of the perfect one, which brings one to the theology of *imago Dei.* It is possible to think that in creating man, God gets out of Himself in a kenotic gesture, as He is the only one capable of *Ek-sistence, ek* in Greek meaning out of. In other words

God, as perfect existence and as source of it creates it by exiting His own subjectivity in a sort of "self-negation," that is why kenotic, but also in a sort of self-affirmation at the same time because creating existence, one affirms it, and God affirms Himself in this way thus giving the created order the sense of belonging.

"The possibility of *ek-sistence* is the negation in itself of subjectivity since it consists of becoming what one is not."[30]

Reflecting this type of *imago Dei* theology, but also the idea of procession and return, Hannah Arendt believes that although man must die, man is "not born in order to die, but in order to begin."[31]

If we speak about existence in general and about birth, life and death in particular, we give to ethics a double dimension, one related to my existence as a human subject where in my personhood I am not distinguished from the others and that connects me to the perfect subject, the divine person, God, and the other one related to my concrete life in this existence which distinguishes me from the others, both dimensions being at mutual interplay and both being major reasons for the most fundamental question one can have: what do I do with what I have and, ultimately, what do I do with who I am. This idea is elaborated by David Hopper when he writes that ethics deals with this life here in the present time and thus has a horizontal character and is individualized, while at the same time keeping its transcendental character.[32]

Thus ethics does bring us towards transcendence. In Karl Barth's words, "As soon as the ethical problem is posed, we begin to have an understanding of what an absolute life could be."[33]

Yet, if there is an absolute, transcendent reality around which our life revolves and on which it depends, if life is the place, time and modality through which everything is decided,"[34] then the question of how I should spend my life and time becomes constant and imperative.

This is all the more important since, according to Erich Fromm's observation, man's life in our society goes in the opposite direction of where it should go. He writes: "Man has become an item to sell on the market of personalities. Success depends on how skillful people are selling themselves on the market, and also on how they can make attractive the box where they are placed as merchandise."[35]

And even worse, like Romulus Vulcanescu put it in a poem, "every single day we are mocking the birds, love, and the sun, and we don't even notice how we leave behind us a desert of despair."

This multi-leveled dramatic crisis that we witness in our world is due in great part to human individualism, as Robert Bellah and his colleagues explain in their book *Habits of the Heart.* Individualism is indeed an existential sin, the image of death, in Roger Garaudy's words.[36]

Conclusion

Having in view that ethics is the vehicle that helps us live together in a much better and meaningful way, but that it is also our vehicle to transcendence and the absolute, to that which is greater than ourselves, and that individualism is such a demon that blocks our way apparently so efficiently, one thing one can do is to look at what is opposite to individualism. And the opposite is communion. Communion implies kenosis, it makes room for the other which prepares one for the ultimate meeting with The Totally Other.

What is needed is a philosophy of the person, not of the individual, and this philosophy, or theology, or ethics has as a model the divine Trinity, a model of supreme love and inter-personal relationships.[37]

According to R. Garaudy, the other is my transcendence,[38] as opposed to Sartre, who said that the other is my hell (l'enfer, c'est les autres). It is the other that humanizes me, because it is being human towards him or her that makes me a human being, to use A.Heschel's expression.[39] In philosophy the highest value is attached to thinking: *cogito ergo sum* (I think therefore I am), Descartes says. In ethics the highest value is love, love of others: "you are therefore I am *(es ergo sum),* or as Dostoievsky paraphrases Descartes: *Amo ergo sum,* I love, therefore I am.

NOTES:

[1] see Alexandru Mironov, "Principiul antropic" [The Anthropic Principle"], in *Curtea de la Arges,* year III, Nr. 9 (22), Sept. 2012, p. 14.

[2] Dumitru Staniloae, *The Experience of God,* Holy Cross Orthodox Press, Brookline, Massachusetts, 1994, p. 162.

[3] Mihai Vinereanu, *Dictionar etimologic al limbii romane [Etymological Dictionary of the Romanian Language],* Ed. Alcor Edimplex, Bucharest, 2008.

[4] see Jesse J. Thomas, "Transcendence and Sentience in Science and Religion," in *Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies,* vol. XXIV, Nr. 1-2, 2012, p. 169.

[5] Alexandru Mironov, *op. cit.,* p. 14.

[6] *Ibidem.*

[7] D. Staniloae, *op. cit.,* p. 173.

[8] *Ibidem.*

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 161.

[10] Theodor Damian, "Logos and Science: Hide and Seek in God's Universe," in *Words and Meanings,* Proceedings of the 11th Conference of ISSEI (The International Society for the Study of European Ideas), on "Language and the Scientific Imagination," University of Helsinki, Finland, Language Center, https://blogs.helsinki.fi/issei/2008.

[11] See Mircea Itu, *Mircea Eliade* (in Romanian), Ed. "Romania de Maine," Bucharest, 2006, pp. 75-76.

[12] Anoushka von Heuer, *Le Huitieme jour ou La dette d'Adam,* Ed. Jean-Luc de Rougemont, Geneve, 1982, p. 78.

[13] D. Staniloae, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 156.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 158.

[16] Joshua A. Reichard, "Western Culture at the American Crossroads: Conflicts Over the Nature of Science and Reason", (book review), in *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies,* Vol. XXIV, Nr. 1-2, 2012, p. 203.

[17] Theodor Damian, "The Desert as a Place of the World's Transformation According to Eastern Asceticism," in Ines Murzaku (Ed.), *Monastic Tradition in Eastern Christianity and the Outside World,* Peeters Publishers, Leuven, Belgium, 2013, p. 57.

[18] see Carlos Eire, "Walking Up to Death," in *First Things,* Nr. 216, October 2011, p. 60.

[19] D. Staniloae, *op. cit.,* p. 157.

[20] Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Complete Works,* translation by Colm Luibheid, foreword and notes by Paul Rorem, preface by Rene Roques, introduction by Jaroslav Pelikan, Jean Leclercq and Karlfried Froehlich, Paulist Press, New York, 1987, p. 83.

[21] Mircea Itu, *op. cit.,* p. 75.

[22] D. Staniloae, *op. cit.,* p. 165.

[23] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man,* Gateway Edition, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1956, p. 7.

[24] D. Staniloae, *op. cit.,* p. 157.

[25] *Ibidem,* p. 156.

[26] Ramin Jahanbegloo, Costica Bradatan, Aurelian Craiutu, "On Margins, Marginals and Marginalities. A Conversation with Ramin Jahanbegloo," in *The European Legacy,* vol. 17, Nr. 6, October 2012, p. 737.

[27] Jesse J. Thomas, *op. cit.,* p. 159.

[28] D. Staniloae, *op. cit.,* p. 151.

[29] R. Kendall Soulen, "Cruising towards Bethlehem," in *God and Human Dignity,* ed. by R. Kendall Soulen and Linda Woodhead, William B. Eerdman Publishers, Gd. Rapids, MI, Cambridge, UK, 2006, p. 105.

[30] André Malet, *Mythos and Logos: La Pensée de R. Bultman,* Labor et Fides, Genève, 1962, p. 12.

[31] see Oskar Gruenwald, "The Quest for Transcendence," in *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies,* vol. IX, Nr. 1-2, 1997, pp. 166-167.

[32] see Jesse J. Thomas, *op. cit.,* p. 171.

[33] Karl Barth, *Parole de Dieu et parole humaine [Word of God and Word of Man],* Impr. France-Quercy-Auvergne, 1966, p. 159.

[34] Dragos Vaida, "Religia, un subiect de actualitate [Religion, a present day subject]", in *Curtea de la Arges,* year III, september 2012, p. 12

[35] Erich Fromm, *Avoir ou être [To Have or To Be],* Editions Laffont, Paris 1978, p. 12.

[36] Roger Garaudy, *Parole d'homme,* Editions Laffont, Paris 1975, p. 63

[37] D. Staniloae, *op. cit.,* p. 148.

[38] Roger Garaudy, *op. cit.,* p. 63.

[39] Abraham Heschel, *Who is Man,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1965, p. 61.

RICHARD GRALLO

Insights & Illusions about Personal Identity[1]

> Caterpillar to Alice: "Who are you?"
> — Alice (in Wonderland)

Introduction

     Personal identity has become an increasingly important topic in the 21st century. Topics such as identity theft, identity politics, and group and individual identity are widely discussed. However, over the last century we have refined our understanding of human growth throughout the life span, and this understanding has highlighted a number of issues regarding just what it means to be human. For example, advances in neuroscience have identified cognitive and emotive functions associated with specific parts of the brain and have traced the growth of these parts of the brain and the emergence of related functions over time. Developmental psychology has identified general life stages associated with specific tasks, problems and abilities and has replaced over-generalized proverbs and slogans with far more specific knowledge. Cognitive and educational psychology have more clearly identified specific acts, operations, processes and habits associated with effective thinking and problem solving. In addition, applied psychology has identified the emotional and behavioral conditions that support not only human problem solving but human flourishing as well.

     It is the thesis of this paper that an adequate, accurate and useful account of personal identity will be based not on partial definitions, but on the full complement of what can be truly known about a person. Systematically excluding anything that we *can* know about ourselves only results in an impoverished and biased account of who we think we are.

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Approaching Personal Identity & Knowledge of Self

Human personal identity is addressed with questions such as these: "Who am I?" or "Who are we?" These questions sit within a context of past and future. Regarding the past, there are questions of origin: "Where did I come from?" and "Where did we come from?" Regarding the future, there are questions about destiny: "Where am I going?" and "Where are we going?"

Any adequate account of human identity will include answers to these questions; in contrast, any account that evades or suppresses these questions will be incomplete, impoverished and biased. It will be incomplete because of the questions and answers left behind. It will be impoverished because the richness of the neglected answers will never be discovered. It will be biased because the systematic exclusion of further relevant questions over time constitutes bias, whether practiced by an individual or group.[2]

To address these questions about personal identity some have turned to a few distinct approaches. One approach emphasizes a list of ten privileged topics: age, culture, disability status, ethnicity, gender, political socialization, race, sex, sexual orientation, socio-economic status. In research, these aspects of people are regarded as variables, i.e. aspects of people that can change under certain conditions. In law, these descriptors have been used to delineate protected classes of people who are entitled to special legal benefits. While these variables do describe some aspects of persons, they never really capture the full reality of personhood. Another approach is the Johari Window, which is a method developed by Lutz and Associates to promote greater self-knowledge.[3] A final approach is to lay out conditions for comprehensive self-knowledge.[4] Since there is no clear limit to the traits, qualities or aspects of persons, our self-knowledge will always be limited. Nevertheless, we can at least propose conditions for an effective *approach* to the limit of fully comprehensive self-knowledge.

Contrasting Views on Personal Identity

There are, then, at least three approaches to knowledge of personal identity, each of which varies in comprehensiveness. These three approaches will be named: (1) the *Cognitive Map of Postmodern Culture (CMPC),* (2) the *Johari Window* and (3) *comprehensive self –knowledge.*

Cognitive Map of Postmodern Culture (CMPC)

The Cognitive Map of Postmodern Culture uses ten basic terms as reference points to better understand human beings. As indicated, they are *age, culture, disability status, ethnicity, gender, political socialization, race, religion, sexual orientation* and *socio-economic status.* Table 1 presents their definitions as put forward by the American Psychological Association.

All of the basic terms are indicative of important aspects of human beings. Each person stands in some relation to all of them. The human attributes to which the terms refer have served important social roles throughout history in many cultural contexts. They have served as a basis for commerce, customs and laws. They have served as a means of classifying groups of people and individuals, sometimes to the benefit of some and to the detriment of others.

In social science research, the ten basic terms have also been recast as measured variables and have framed many studies of human thought and behavior. They are often considered as potential *predictors* and potential *causes* of various human outcomes. In addition, they have been used in a wide collection of *group differences* studies and *correlational studies* of all sorts. In psychology, for example, Lee Cronbach has mapped out the landscape for most of this kind of research.[5]

In addition to social science research, there is also the general culture. In the general culture, the ten basic terms have been widely adopted by print and electronic media. However, this practice tends to systematically exclude other human attributes from serious examination. As attention is repeatedly directed towards the basic ten terms, to exclusion of others, they become a *privileged vocabulary* that is used to frame most social discourse.

TEN DIMENSIONS OF A COGNITIVE MAP FOR POST-MODERN CULTURE	
Reference Point	**Definition**
Age	"the amount of time that has passed since and organism's birth." (p.29)
Culture	"the distinctive customs, values, belief, knowledge, art and language of a society or a community. These values and practices are passed on from generation to generation, and they are the basis for everyday behaviors and practices." (p. 274)
Disability	"a lasting physical or mental impairment that significantly interferes with an individual's ability to function in one or more central life activities, such as self-care, ambulation, communication, social interaction, sexual expression or employment." (p. 317)
Ethnicity	"a social categorization based on an individual's membership in or identification with a particular cultural or ethnic group." (p. 386)
Gender	"the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female." (p. 450)
Political Socialization	"the transmission of political norms through social agents such as schools, parents, peers or the mass media." (p. 805)
Race	"a socially defined concept sometimes used to designate a portion or 'subdivision' of the human population with common physical characteristics, ancestry or language. The term is also loosely applied to geographic, cultural, religious or national groups." (p. 875)
Religion	"a system of spiritual beliefs, practices or both, typically organized around worship of an all-powerful deity (or deities) and involving behaviors such as prayer, meditation and participation in collective rituals." (p. 903)

Sexual Orientation	"one's enduring sexual attraction to male partners, female partners or both. Sexual orientation may be heterosexual, homosexual (gay or lesbian), or bisexual." (p. 974)
Socio-Economic Status	"the position of an individual or group on the socioeconomic scale, which is determined by a combination of social and economic factors such as income, amount and kind of education, type and prestige of occupation, place of residence and- in some societies or parts of society- ethnic origin or religious background." (p. 1003)
NB: References from *APA Dictionary of Psychology*[6]	
Table 1	

In the academy, these basic terms have also been widely adopted, often to the exclusion of others.[7] There too, they become a *privileged vocabulary* that is used to frame a great deal of social science discourse and to shape what investigations are permissible and funded and those that are not. In the extreme case, the *privileged vocabulary* can be used to determine what conclusions are acceptable (politically correct) and publishable and what conclusions are not.[8]

Since all of the ten basic terms are indicative of important aspects of human beings, the CMPC is useful in promoting some learning. Learning here includes comprehensive understanding, knowledge and responsible practice. Achieving comprehensive understanding and tested knowledge is a protracted process and is clearly described by Daniel Kahneman as *System II thinking*.[9] Used appropriately, the CMPC and its ten reference points can assist in gaining understanding and knowledge by: (1) pointing the way to exploration of broad social topics, (2) yielding a first approximation to understanding social trends and historical events, and (3) identifying real gaps in understanding, knowledge and practice that would be better addressed than left unattended.

As potentially useful as the ten variables of CMPC are, they most often leave out of consideration the following: individual similarities and differences, group similarities, learning and personality traits. As a simple thought experiment to demonstrate the importance of what is left out, consider what would be the most

important personal characteristics in choosing a roommate. The ten privileged variables from the CMPC and Table 1 will likely diminish in importance in contrast with traits associated with personality and with learning. For example, is the potential roommate conscientious or not? Is the potential roommate emotionally stable or not? Is the potential roommate trustworthy or not? Does the potential roommate learn from mistakes or not?

Used inappropriately the CMPC and its reference points can: (1) highlight differences to the neglect of similarities, (2) reinforce stereotypes, (3) thereby promote social division, (4) can be used as an instrument of bias (in Lonergan's sense) to block useful exploration, conversation and dialogue.[10] In addition, the restrictive use of CMPC described here is (5) insufficient for many purposes, especially purposes involving small groups or individuals, and (6) it is static and therefore cannot capture dynamic trends such as development and learning. Used inappropriately it will lead to the endorsement of reductionist statements such as "I am nothing but my group identity" or "We are simply our group membership." All the richness of learning, history and personality is lost. General semantics reminds us that "The map is not the territory."[11] Any map will necessarily leave out the rich details of *experience* of the territory. Moreover, maps may be misleading in other ways, in which case another map is needed.

Johari Window

Another way to approach personal identity is through self-knowledge. A more detailed account of *personal identity* is given in accurate self-knowledge. The *Johari Window* is a method for mapping out current knowledge and ignorance of self.[12] (See Figure 1.) This method attends to what is known and unknown regarding self in the context of other persons. The method uses a list of fifty six pre-selected adjectives to describe what is known about oneself by oneself and by others. It also describes what is unknown about self by self and others using the same adjectives.

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Johari Window

	Known to self	Not known to self
Known to others	Arena	Blind Spot
Not Known to Others	Façade	Unknown

Figure 1

The method proceeds as a group exercise. Person X selects words from a list of 56 adjectives that s/he affirms as an accurate description of self. Peers in the group also select adjectives that they affirm accurately describe Person X. The data collected result in four quadrants of knowledge and ignorance about Person X. There is the *open self* or *arena* (Quadrant 1) which consists of knowledge about X possessed by both self and others. The *blind spot* (Quadrant 2) consists of knowledge of self, possessed by others, but not by X. The *hidden self* or *façade* (Quadrant 3) consists of knowledge of X possessed by self but not by others. Finally, the *unknown self* (Quadrant 4) consists of aspects of X that are unknown to both self and others.

Typical results of using this method indicate that our self-knowledge is incomplete at best. For example, Quadrant 2 (the *blind spot)* indicates that others may know some aspects of ourselves better than we do. Quadrant 4 (the *unknown self)* indicates a realm of mystery – a known-unknown. Whatever is a "known-unknown" is signaled by a collection of further relevant questions that remain unanswered at the present time. This includes all past and present aspects of self not known by anyone, but it also includes all future aspects of self.

The *Johari Window* represents an improvement of an exclusive and biased use of CMPC because it provides more detail about individuals. It highlights how our self-knowledge is limited, and it provides a prominent place for mystery in Quadrant 4. However, the method also leaves some things out. The method is

limited by its list of fifty-six preselected adjectives. It could be greatly expanded if it used all adjectives used in a given language that normally describe human persons. Such a procedure was actually employed by Raymond Cattell and his associates (1957, 1989) in their development of the 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire.[13] The method is also limited in that it provides simply a snapshot of a person in time. Dynamic factors such as development and learning, which are key to identity and self-knowledge are left out.

Comprehensive Self-Knowledge
& Conditions for Approaching It

Comprehensive self-knowledge is neither a list of personal traits nor a method for obtaining self-knowledge. In contrast, it is the theoretical limit reached by obtaining complete self-knowledge. According to Bernard Lonergan "Being is what is to be known by the totality of correct judgments."[14] Therefore, my being (my self) is to be known by the totality of correct judgments about me.

Potentially, such self-knowledge can attend to any aspect of me: past, present and future. Potentially, this self-knowledge leaves out no aspect of me. However, the self-knowledge that I actually have is enveloped in the known-unknown of mystery. Many true judgments about my past have been forgotten by me or were never made by me in the first place. Many aspects of my current self are not grasped by my limited understanding and judgment. Many truths about my future self are unknown at this time.

From a psychological point of view, *self-knowledge* is the sum total of insights regarding self that have been tested and verified in experience. Self-knowledge is important because it includes an assessment of strengths and weakness that may be relevant to a variety of tasks and situations. Without self-knowledge one remains unaware of these strengths and weaknesses and is ill-equipped to face a variety of problem solving situations and tasks moving forward. In addition, from a psychological point of view, *self-appropriation* is the taking ownership of oneself. This includes taking ownership of one's self-knowledge, as well as ownership of one's emotional and behavioral habits. Taking such ownership places us in a position to develop beyond our current limits, but without such self-ownership we are cognitively, emotively and behaviorally out of control and

susceptible to being controlled by others. *Self-knowledge* and *self-appropriation* are limited concrete states of consciousness that lead to greater consciousness, effectiveness and freedom.

Practices that facilitate the acquisition of greater self-knowledge focus on key examples in one's life of specific *facts of consciousness,* including questions and insights, images and feelings, judgments and decisions.[15] Key examples of facts of consciousness are those that have turned out to make a significant difference in one's life. For example, there may be *questions* that seem to pursue us, rather than the other way around. However, they place us on a quest that extends over time and seeks to overcome a variety of obstacles. There may be key *insights* that provide dramatic answers to our guiding questions. There may be *images* or *feelings* that delight or disturb us, but which are recurrent in their presentation and which seem to call for a response. There may be key *judgments* of fact or of value that have shaped us by what they grasp or fail to grasp; and there may be key *decisions* that have the effect of setting us on a course of action that leads to a plethora of consequences, both expected and unexpected.

These key points in our lives are completely missed by the CMPC and largely missed by the Johari Window. Hence, the patterns revealed by a study of these key events of consciousness cannot be uncovered by those approaches. The key events present a richness of detail that will account for individual uniqueness in personality, individual differences and similarities. For example, the key events can illuminate how a person grew by transcending previous cognitive and moral limitations. Also, the key events can illustrate whether or not a person identified mistakes in understanding, judgment or action and what was done to correct those mistakes.[16]

Managing Self as Mindful Practice

The question remains as to what can be done practically to navigate in a world that uses different maps. Here some ancient thinkers may provide some mindful guidance: that is, they can help to focus on the *facts of consciousness.* Consider both Aristotle and Epictetus.

In the *Topics,* Aristotle examines rules for learning and discussion. These rules are his "topics." He focuses on mental training

and preparation for real dialogue. With the *facts of consciousness* in mind, the recommendations here may fall into two groups: (1) the mental training of preparation of oneself and transformation into a *learning personality,* and (2) practice and modeling of *learning dialogues.*

    Mental Training: By preparing for learning and participating in it one gradually transforms oneself into a *learning personality,* that is, a person who routinely seeks to learn from all or most situations. This mental training includes the following interventions: (1) reignite and nurture the *desire to know,* (2) identify instances of merely associative and automatic thoughts (Kahneman's *System I thinking).* (3) interrogate images and automatic thoughts to uncover their origins and consequences, and (4) think in opposites. This helps identify biases and to reverse them. It also helps in identifying assumptions. (5) Engage in the appropriate activities of seeking expanded understanding. Be guided by the question "What do I need or want to understand about this?" (6) Engage in appropriate activities to seek the truth. Be guided by the question "What do I need/want to know about this?"

    Dialogue: Mental training is not enough. It serves as preparation for *authentic dialogue* with others. *Authentic dialogue* is conversation marked by levels of respect or generosity (such as civility, courtesy or graciousness) and by the presence of the desire to know. At the center of authentic dialogue will be a shared interest in identifying and pursuing adequate answers to further relevant questions.[17] Authentic dialogue tends to foster good feeling and friendship. Authentic dialogue is always a *learning event.*

    Authentic dialogue stands in contrast to *inauthentic dialogue.* This type of interaction may have the outward appearance of a "conversation." However neither generosity nor the desire to know is present. Sometimes these interactions are marked by an astonishing lack of generosity as evidenced in incivility, rudeness, or outright hostility.

    As a matter of practice a learning personality fosters learning events through authentic dialogue. Such persons practice learning and model authentic dialogues for others. The practice of fostering learning events and modeling authentic dialogue includes the following interventions. (1) Monitor the presence of the *desire to know* in any emerging conversation and proceed accordingly. The

desire to know is a condition for real learning and for authentic dialogue. (2) If the desire to know is not present, identify different types of inauthentic "conversation." Two examples may suffice. Some persons enter what appears to be a conversation only for the purpose of venting feelings or expressing an opinion. They seek to learn nothing. Others enter simply to have their opinions "validated." They seek the approval of others. In both cases, a precondition of learning, the desire to know, is not present. (3) If the desire to know is present, promote System II thinking by modeling experience, understanding, judging and deciding as appropriate. In addition, we can promote System II thinking by practicing *co-learning* with our interlocutors as guided by the question "What do we need or want to learn about this?" (4) Infuse all teaching and supervision with the principles 1-3.

Epictetus provides additional guidance by indicating how we can focus on our impressions, our interpretations of them, our judgments and our choices. Most of these events, especially the last three, are under our control. By making these events the main object of study we increase our effective freedom and do not waste time on what is not in our control.[18]

These attitudes represent a "growth mindset"[19] as well as a *learning personality*.[20] They represent a growth mindset because they represent a shift away from static conceptual categories and toward the dynamic processes of learning. They represent a learning personality because they reignite and prioritize the desire to know, they make time and space for learning, they remind us to surround ourselves with other learners and they foster the habit of improving habits.

As one learns and grows, greater self-knowledge and self-mastery is acquired. With these comes greater effective freedom. One consistently transcends previous limits of viewpoint, emotion and behavior. In addition, as one learns and grows one is likely to amass more information on both changing and stable group memberships. It becomes abundantly clear that group membership is not an adequate container for the richness of personal identity. Most statements such as "I am nothing but…." or "We are nothing but…" drop by the wayside as hopelessly outdated and incapable of keeping up with my dynamic development.

Summary and Implications

Table 2 presents a summary of both key insights and illusions regarding personal identity.

SUMMARY OF INSIGHTS AND ILLUSIONS ABOUT PERSONAL IDENTITY		
Insight	**Illusion**	**Comment**
Membership in important socially identified groups can offer some understanding of people. The Cognitive Map of Postmodern Culture (CMPC) is an example of this effort.	Group membership is not identity. Reliance on group membership alone systematically excludes relevant information about self.	Individual differences and similarities are always excluded from CMPC. Group similarities are often excluded from CMPC.
Personality traits can offer a more detailed account of personal identity than can the CMPC. The *Johari Window* is an example of this approach.	*Johari Window* and other efforts like it are based on a limited list of static traits.	Since the list is limited, it cannot grasp the completeness of self. Since the traits are static, dynamic aspects of self are excluded.
Accurate and complete *self-knowledge* is the only sound basis for personal identity.	Self-knowledge is not needed to grasp personal identity,	Highly detailed knowledge of self is possible, but it is not complete.
Accurate and complete self-knowledge cannot be achieved in this lifetime.	Accurate and complete self-knowledge can be achieved in this lifetime.	In this life, knowledge of self will always contain an element of mystery (a known-unknown)
Table 2		

If these points are accurate, then a number of implications follow. First, *personal freedom* is likely to be best served by the most inclusive and comprehensive approach: the pursuit of *self-knowledge.* Even though our self-knowledge will always be limited, exclusive reliance on the other approaches is too confining and inflexible. It will tend to cut off the vertical freedom to "think outside the box" and to develop more comprehensive viewpoints that overcome the shortcomings of their predecessors. The rich details of developing personality are left behind. Second, as indicated, pursuit of accurate and comprehensive self-knowledge is an example of a growth mindset and it fosters the development of a learning personality. Third, the pursuit of accurate and comprehensive self-knowledge has implications for one's quality of life. It opens up new options and corrects time-consuming and expensive mistakes. Finally, in contrast, the failure to develop adequate *self-knowledge* will constrain the emergence of more comprehensive views of the self and its world, and it will block the freedom that comes with that more expansive view.

NOTES:

[1] Richard Grallo, PhD is Professor of Applied Psychology at Metropolitan College of New York. These remarks are based on a presentation made at the Annual Theological, Ecumenical and Interdisciplinary Symposium organized by the Romanian Institute of Orthodox Theology and Spirituality and held at Metropolitan College of New York in 2017. Thanks to Professor Theodor Damian for 25 years of this conference and the journal *Symposium.*

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[3] J. Luft and H. Ingham, "The Johari window, a graphic model of interpersonal awareness" in *Proceedings of the western training laboratory in group development,* University of California, Los Angeles, 1955.

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[5] American Psychological Association, *APA Dictionary of Psychology,* American Psychological Association, Washington DC, 2015.

[6] L. J. Cronbach, "Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology," in *American Psychologist*, *12*, 1957, pp. 671-684; L. J. Cronbach, "Beyond the Two

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[7] J. Butler, J., "Intersectionality and Liberal Education," in *Liberal education 103,* 2017, pp. 38-45.

[8] Maryanne Garry and Harlene Hayne (eds.), *Do justice and let the sky fall: Elizabeth Loftus and Her Contributions to Science, Law and Academic Freedom.* Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, 2007; Joachim Kreuger (ed.), *Rationality and Social Responsibility: Essays in Honor of Robyn Mason Dawes,* Psychology Press, New York, 2008.

[9] D. Kahneman, D., *Thinking, fast and slow,* Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, New York, 2013.

[10] B. Lonergan, B. *op. cit.,* see chs. VI and VII.

[11] Alfred Korzybski, *Science and sanity: An introduction to non-Aristotelean systems and General Semantics,* Institute for General Semantics, Forest Hills, NY, 1995.

[12] J. Luft and H. Ingham, *op. cit.*

[13] R. B. Cattell, *Personality and motivation structure and measurement*, World Book, New York, 1957; H. B. Cattell, *The 16PF: Personality in Depth,* Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, Champaign, IL, 1989.

[14] B. Lonergan, *op. cit.,* p. 401.

[15] B. Cronin, *Phenomenology of human understanding,* Pickwick Publications, Eugene, OR, 2017; M. Morelli, *Self-possession: Being at home in conscious performance,* Lonergan Institute, Chestnut Hill, MA, 2015; P. Byrne, *The ethics of discernment: Lonergan's foundations for ethics,* University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada, 2016.

[16] See for example: William Mathews, *Lonergan's Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight,* University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada, 2005.

[17] F. Lawrence, "Language as Horizon?," in F. Lawrence (ed.), *The Beginning and the Beyond: Papers from the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences,* Scholars Press, Chico, CA, 1984.

[18] Richard Grallo, "Epictetus in the City," in *Symposium, XXIV*(1), 2017, pp. 15-25.

[19] Carol Dweck, *Mindset: The new psychology of success,* Random House, New York, 2006; Carol Dweck, *Mindset: How you can fulfill your potential,* Constable & Robinson Limited, London, UK, 2012.

[20] Richard Grallo, *op. cit.*

LOUIS TIETJE

Driverless Cars: A New Occasion for the Trolley Problem

> *And why not do evil that good may come? – as some people*
> *slanderously charge us with saying. Their condemnation is just.*
> Romans 3:8

The Beginning

While discussing the permissibility of abortion, philosopher Philippa Foot introduced the first trolley scenario in 1967:

The driver of a runaway tram [trolley] . . . can only steer from one narrow track on to another; five men are working on one track and one man on the other; anyone on the track he enters is bound to be killed.[1]

Morally, Foot analyzed the scenario as a conflict of negative duties: the duty to avoid injuring one versus the duty to avoid injuring five. She concluded that the apparent resolution of the conflict is to do the least injury:

The steering driver faces a conflict of negative duties, since it is his duty to avoid injuring five men and also his duty to avoid injuring one. In the circumstances he is not able to do both, and it seems clear that he should do the least injury he can.[2]

Over the years, many versions of this scenario have been analyzed in terms of a conflict between a negative duty not to kill and a positive duty to save. For some, this may be a distinction without a different, but for others the difference might be decisive. In their view, a negative duty is stronger and may override the weaker positive duty. Either way, the scenario involves a moral dilemma, which has several defining characteristics:

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The crucial features of a moral dilemma are these: the agent is required to do each of two (or more) actions; the agent can do each of the actions; but the agent cannot do both (or all) of the actions. The agent thus seems condemned to moral failure; no matter what she does, she will do something wrong (or fail to something that she ought to do).[3]

A moral dilemma might involve a conflict of negative duties not to do something wrong or negative duties that conflict with positive duties to do what one ought to do.

Trolleyology: Decline and Renewal

A few years later, another philosopher, Judith Thomson, coined the term "trolley problem" and stimulated so much interest among philosophers that "trolleyology," a specialized area of philosophy, was born. Lauren Cassani Davis says that "Thomson's writing sparked so much interest in the philosophical community that a sub-discipline of 'trolleyology' emerged in the '70s and '80s."[4] Thompson created two famous versions of the problem: the "footbridge" and the "switch." As Davis summarizes,

In the "footbridge" scenario (also known as "fat man"), the streetcar is heading towards five workers, but this time you're on a footbridge over the track. Standing precariously close to the edge of the bridge next to you is a very large man, who, if he happened to topple onto the track below, could stop the trolley before it reaches the five. Do you push him?[5]

Joshua Greene summarizes the switch version in this way:

A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if nothing is done. You can save these five people by hitting a switch that can turn the trolley onto a sidetrack. Unfortunately, there is a single workman on the side-track who will be killed if you hit the switch.

Is it morally acceptable to turn the trolley away from the five and onto the one?[6]

By the late '90s, philosophical trolleyology went out of fashion. Philosophers began to question the value of the atypical and artificial scenarios. But neuroscientist Joshua Greene published an article in 2001 that revived interest in the trolley problem. He put people in an fMRI machine to see what happened in their brains when

confronted with various trolley scenarios. He discovered that the switch case elicited increased activity in the regions of the brain associated with reasoning. Most people (87%) approve of flipping the switch. The footbridge case, however, elicited increased activity in the regions of the brain associated with emotion. Most people (69%) disapprove of pushing the man.[7] Greene concluded that "in the footbridge dilemma, sacrificing one person for the greater good seems wrong, a gross violation of individual rights. In the switch dilemma, trading one life for five seems justified, if not ideal."[8]

Moral Assessments of the Trolley Scenarios

How do we account for what "seems wrong" or "justified"? In general, philosophers have proposed two different approaches to moral assessment: teleological or deontological. Deontological theories "emphasize the nature of the act . . . These theories hold that something is inherently right or good about such acts as truth telling and promise keeping and inherently wrong or bad about such acts as lying and promise breaking."[9] Alternatively, teleological theories "focus primarily on consequences in determining moral rightness and wrongness."[10] "Teleological theories, then, make the right, the obligatory, and the morally good dependent on the nonmorally good."[11] Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is often used as the deontological representative, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) the teleological representative.

In Kant's theory, the moral standard that is usually thought of as central is a version of what he calls the "categorical imperative": "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only."[12] Joshua Green suggests "a rough translation: Don't use people."[13] In John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theory, the moral standard is utility or happiness, the nonmoral good: "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."[14] In Greene's summary: "Maximize happiness impartially."[15]

These theories offer contrasting moral assessments of Philippa Foot's case as well as the switch and footbridge cases. Kant would likely disagree with Foot that the driver of the trolley should

"do the least injury he can," implying that he should steer away from the five and toward the one. Kant would probably recommend that the driver do nothing and avoid taking positive action to use one person to avoid injuring five others. I believe his recommendation would be the same in the switch and footbridge cases. We should not take any action in which one person is used only as a means to benefit others. Mill would disagree with Kant in all three cases and recommend an action in which one person is sacrificed for five: In Foot's case, steer the trolley toward the one; in the switch case, flip the switch; and in the footbridge case, push the man. These actions will "maximize happiness impartially."

The recommendations of the two modern moral theorists are not consistent with most people's intuition about what should be done. Is there a better theory? An older theory that originated with Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) has been used for centuries in the analysis of similar cases. This theory is called the "doctrine of double effect."

The doctrine says, roughly, that it is always wrong to do a bad act intentionally in order to bring about good consequences, but it is sometimes permissible to do a good act [when the bad effect is foreseen but not intended and the good effect is at least equivalent in importance to the bad act] despite knowing that it will bring about bad consequences.[16]

How does the doctrine apply to the three cases? One philosopher explains,

It would be wrong to throw someone into the path of a runaway trolley in order to stop it and keep it from hitting five people on the track ahead; that would involve intending harm to the one as a means of saving the five. But it would be permissible to divert a runaway trolley onto a track holding one and away from a track holding five: in that case one foresees the death of the one as a side effect of saving the five but one does not intend it.[17]

The conclusion is the same in Foot's case: It is permissible to steer the trolley toward one man because his death in unintended. This analysis is consistent with Greene's finding that most people believe it is permissible to flip the switch but not push the man.

Relevance to Driverless Cars

Let us start with the following scenario:

Imagine someone is driving down a country road and a whole gang of people jump out in front of her car. There's an escaped convict, a toddler, a mother with a baby, a 95-year-old war veteran, and a small kitten called "pickle." She can't break or swerve and she's going to kill one of them. Which should she pick?

In this scenario, all the moral theories recommend the same answer: Pick the small kitten. For Kant, the reason is that the kitten is not a person. For Mill, an animal certainly has some utility value but not as much as a human being. For an adherent of the doctrine of double effect, picking the kitten is permissible because its death is not intended, and the good effect is at least equivalent in importance to the bad act.

In a scenario involving a driverless car,

Imagine a driverless car going down a narrow street. The passenger inside has no control whatsoever of the behavior of the vehicle. Suddenly a group of five people steps off the pavement and onto the road. The car registers the danger immediately, but it is already too close to stop before hitting the group. The only possible evasive maneuver is to swerve to the side. But in so doing, the car will crash into a passerby who is walking down the street.

In another version of this scenario, the car does not swerve into a bystander but rather into a solid wall. In doing so, the car will probably sacrifice its passenger in order to avoid hitting the group of five people.

Which case does this scenario most resemble: the Foot, switch, or footbridge? The scenario is not like the footbridge case because a person is not used to avoid harming or to save other people. The scenario might be like the Foot case if it involves a conflict of two negative duties. It resembles the switch case in that it might involve a conflict either between two negative duties (avoid injuring one or five people) or between a negative and positive duty (sacrifice one person to save five people).

How should the car be programmed? According to Kantian theory, the car should be programmed to stay the course, that is, to run over the group of five. Of course, the result is not "intended." It seems straightforward that in utilitarian theory the car should be programmed to avoid hitting the five and swerve into the passerby

(saving five maximizes happiness). In the second version of the scenario, Should the car be programmed to sacrifice its own passenger? Many will say, Of course not, if I am the passenger! Kant would agree, but not for self-interested reasons. He would say that no one inside or outside the car should be used only as means to the end of saving (or avoiding harm to) others. Applying the doctrine of double effect is not straightforward because a car does not possess intention. One might say that the car only executes the intention of the programmer, which could not be to harm anyone. If so, the utilitarian recommendation is morally preferred.

Consider a different kind of scenario: a pedestrian in the crosswalk. In this case,

a car is stopped at a traffic light, and a pedestrian is in the crosswalk directly in front of it. The car detects that a truck is coming too fast from behind and will hit the car. The car cannot move forward without hitting the pedestrian. The car has two options. It can do nothing, allow itself to be hit by the truck, and hit the pedestrian. On the other hand, the car can move forward and hit the pedestrian but avoid being hit by the truck.

The recommendations of our moral theorists are less straightforward in this scenario. For Kant, the moral course of action seems clear: do nothing. The car should not be programmed to use anyone only as a means. Given that the car will actively or passively hit the pedestrian, what utilitarian calculation will maximize happiness impartially? In either course of action, the fate of the pedestrian is the same. The utilitarian might recommend hitting the pedestrian to avoid damage to the car, which would be the action that maximizes happiness overall. But is the maximization impartial? Or partial to the driver? Since a programmer, not the driver, made the decision, perhaps it is.

If the programmer has moral integrity, that is, a good intention, an advocate of the doctrine of double effect might follow either the utilitarian or Kantian recommendation. On the other hand, the doctrine might not be relevant in this case because, in either course of action, there is only one effect on a person. The other effect is damage to the car. The scenario contains no information about the wellbeing of the truck driver or the driver of the car. Will either or both be harmed in any way?

Issues in Moral Programming

The integrity of the programmer depends on the moral program. What is the best program? In his fMRI experiments, Greene uncovered evidence for three evaluative distinctions: action/omission, means/side effect, and personal force/no personal force. Action, means, and personal force push our emotional buttons; omission, side effect, and not personal force do not. We feel that pushing the man in the footbridge case is morally wrong because harm is caused as the means to an end by an action with personal force. Greene argues that Kant's theory is based on this feeling. His theory is a rationalization of automatic emotional responses. As already noted, emotional parts of the brain light up in fMRI experiments when people are exposed to the footbridge case. Utilitarianism is based on reason, and, in the absence of the emotional buttons, the parts of the brain that involve reasoning light up in fMRI experiments when people are exposed to the switch case (as previously mentioned). At the deepest level, the differences between moral theories derive from a conflict between emotion and reason.[18]

Given this conflict, moral psychology will not help us identify the best program. But if driverless cars become an integral part of our society, someone will have to make programming decisions. Who will decide which moral theory to use? One option is to allow consumers to decide through their purchases. Manufacturers can program cars to meet the demand. This does not seem to be a viable option because of the conflicts that will inevitably arise, as illustrated in our scenarios, not to mention the problem of how the legal system will adjudicate the many lawsuits that will be filed. More likely, the national government will appoint an ethics board or enact regulations. State governments may start the regulatory process, but eventually the national government will become involved to ensure consistency across the states.

This does not mean that the rulings of an ethics board or government regulations will be morally consistent, but it is difficult to see how morality in this area will not be imposed on all citizens. Any moral program will be controversial. Will we have to abide by the decisions of congressional representatives, or, in the final analysis, by one justice of the supreme court in a 5 to 4 decision?

A concluding question: Once the program is in place, will citizens be relieved of moral responsibility for what their cars do?

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[9] Louis P. Pojman and James Fieser, *Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong,* 6th ed., Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, 2009, p. 10.

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Doru Tsaganea

Nation and Nationalism in Historical Perspective

Introductory Remark

In the current historical period of significant development of populism, the concepts of nation and nationalism are frequently discussed not only in the academia, but also in the popular media and political arena. A nonnegligible number of activists, politicians and journalists associate them with racism, right wing extremism and xenophobia, and/or with propagandistic notions like "white supremacy," "white nationalism" and "eurocentrism." For this reason, I focus in this brief paper on the true and real meaning of the concepts of nation and nationalism, and on their historical roots.

The Concept of Nation

In accordance with the classical definition, the nation is a community of human beings who have:
- common ethnic origin,
- common language,
- common history,
- common culture,
- common religion (frequently, but not always),
- common territory (frequently, but not always),
- consciousness of their unity, essence and identity,

or according to the most frequently quoted definition (not only in the Marxist literature but also in the Western liberal academic literature, although it was given by Stalin!) "the nation is a stable community of human beings, historically developed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychology expressed

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in a common culture." In another translation "a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."

The Dictionary.com defines a nation as "a large body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government, particularly its own."

In turn, the *Cambridge English Dictionary* explains the concept of nation as being

"a country, especially when thought as a large group of people living in one area with their own government, language and traditions."

For better understanding the concept of nation it is useful to compare it with the concepts of people and elite.

According to the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* a people is "a group or assembly of human beings united by a common interest," and according to *Wikipedia* "a people is a group of individuals who belong and act in a specific society."

Taking into consideration additional definitions, it is possible to affirm that in accordance with the most points of view, the main characteristics of a people are:
- common origin,
- language (to a large extent) common,
- territory (to a large extent) common,
- survival (usually) in a state, or in a state like political structure,
- consciousness of its survival as a people, and to a large extent consciousness of its unity, but only limited consciousness of its identity caused by the lack of a common economy and culture.

In parallel, the elite is defined as "the group of people who embodies what is the best, the most valuable, in a community, society, etc."

Comparing the concepts of nation and people one observes without any difficulty that the nation is the superior stage – and until present the last – stage in the evolution of a people. The nation is different from the people because it has as essential definitory characteristics: a unitary language (and not significantly

differentiated dialects), a relatively developed common culture usually associated with the common language, and – very important – the consciousness of its identity as a distinct group of people.

From the point of view of the definitory elements of the concepts of nation and people, any nation is a people but not any people is a nation. The nation emerges only at a specific point in time in a people's evolution. In the 19th century the Spaniards, the Italians, the Germans or the Britons were nations, but in the 16th century they were peoples.

If the difference between nation and people refers to the elements of the concepts, the difference between nation and elite is given by the spheres of the two concepts. Any elite is a portion of a nation or people. But any nation or people is not a part of an elite.

The Concept of Nationalism

In the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, nationalism is defined with a large meaning as "loyalty and devotement to a nation," and with a special meaning as "a sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its own culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups."

Similarly, *Encyclopedia Britannica* defines nationalism as "ideology based on the premise that the individual's loyalty and devotion to the nation state surpass other individual or group interests."

Comparing various definitions of nationalism, one observes that they can be included in two different groups. One group includes definitions that refer to common ancestry, language, territory, culture and consciousness of identity, but do not regard one nation as being superior to others. The definitions included in the second group include all or some of these elements, but emphasize – or even strongly emphasize - the idea of the one nation's (the nationalist's nation) superiority over other nations or peoples.

Apparently, this difference is not very significant, but in practice it is, and it entails important socio-economic and political consequences going from tensioned international relations to all-out war. It is something comparable to what happened with other concepts and words – socialism for example. For many European

countries and parties, socialism means social democracy and promotion of social rights, for Marxist-Leninists it has meant a transitory stage between capitalism and communism, and for the German National Socialists was Hitler's political doctrine. Therefore, it is important and necessary to use in English two different words for the two different concepts as it is done in other languages like French or Romanian.

The word "nationalism" should be used only for the concept of nationalism that does not stress the superiority of a nation over another, which is the classical one and historically emerged the first. And the words "chauvinistic nationalism" must be used for the concept that emphasize the superiority of one nation over another.

The distinction between nationalism and patriotism is also important because they are frequently used as being similar although they are not. The concept of patriotism is probably as old as peoples are, and the word denominating it has its origin in "patria," the more than two thousand years old Latin word for country. Significantly different, the concept and word nationalism are only two hundred years old and originate from the concept of nation.

In the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* patriotism is defined as "love for or devotion to one's country," and in *Encyclopedia Britannica* as "feeling of attachment and commitment to a country, nation, or political community." Similarly, *Dictionary.com* describes patriotism as "devoted love, support, and defense of one's country; national loyalty," and *Wikipedia* states that "patriotism or national pride is the feeling of love, devotion and sense of attachment to a homeland and alliance with other citizens who share the same sentiment."

Subsequently, taking into consideration these definitions, it is undoubtful that the two concepts are not similar. The relationship between the two concepts is one from the general to particular, patriotism being the general concept and nationalism the particular one. In other words, any type of nationalism is also patriotism, but any type of patriotism is not nationalism. The fighters for the unification of Italy in the 19th century were patriots and nationalists because the Italian nation emerged at the end of 18th century and beginning of the 19th century. But the great personalities of the Italian Renaissance were only patriots because in the 15th and 16th centuries there was only the Italian people, but not the Italian nation.

Historical Emergence of Nationalism

The nationalism as an ideology and incentive for political and military action emerged at the end of 18th century and beginning of the 19th century in Europe. At that time most European peoples had attained the nation stage in their ethnic, political, economic and cultural evolution because several historical conditions had been fulfilled.

Those conditions that had been necessary for the transformation of peoples into nations were:
- apparition and consolidation of centralized unitary states
- development of communications
- unification and homogenization of language
- development of common economy
- development of common culture
- development of national identity

The emergence and development of nationalism was stimulated by the following factors:
- struggle for liberation from imperial domination
- struggle against foreign occupation
- struggle for creation of national states
- struggle against colonialism
- struggle for preservation of national culture and national moral, political and social values

The emergence and development of nationalist ideology in Europe was stimulated in a complex manner by the ideas of the French Revolution of 1789 and by the Napoleonian campaigns. As a result of the spreading of Enlightenment ideas promoted by the French Revolution and Napoleon himself, the Europeans started to perceive themselves as citizens belonging to nations living in nation-states and not as subjects of kings and emperors. But at the same time they realized their civic responsibilities and they felt that it has been their duty to fight for the freedom and independence of their countries or for the unification of the provinces in which they were living.

The Spanish nationalists fought against the Napoleonian military occupation in order to preserve the unitary state created in the 15th century by Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile. And that was a popular war of national liberation, although the political values promoted by post-revolutionary Napoleonian France were

superior to those existing in Spain at that time as it is proved by the fact that the current meaning of the word "guerilla" emerged during that war.

At the beginning of the 19th century the German nationalists fought against Napoleon for defending the independence of their states, and in the second half of the 19th century for the unification of Germany. The same goal of liberation from foreign occupation, national unification and independence was followed and finally achieved by the Italians and Romanians in the second part of the 19th century and by the peoples of the Hapsburg Empire and Soviet Union in the 20th century.

Therefore, it is possible to affirm at the end of this brief paper, that nationalism – as significantly different from chauvinistic nationalism – has been an ideology and political movement that has had a very important role in the liberation of peoples from empires' domination, national unification, international recognition of state independence as well as in nations' political, social economic and cultural progress.

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HEINZ-UWE HAUS

Redefining Identity: European Unification as Transcultural Challenge

If we talk about identity, we should not forget why the people said "no" to Communism: (1) *Because of its cynical concept of human rights.* Rights were granted to individuals by the State in exchange for loyal social behavior. Such practice attempted to justify the government's cruel control of people's destinies in the name of revolutionary ideals. The regime graciously granted what it had ruthlessly deprived them of. (2) *The Central and Eastern European revolution was directed against the Communist "command economy."* Seventy years after the Bolshevik *coup d'etat,* 48 million Soviet citizens lived below the poverty level as measured by Soviet standards! And (3) *The revolution pulled down the central pillar in the political structure of socialist society:* the permanent and unconditional monopoly of power held by the Communist Party and its government. The party of Marxism-Leninism acted as authentic interpreter and implementer of the monolithic will of the people. Such understanding was not only the pillar of Communist totalitarianism but also one of the main (though not the only) causes of the social crisis and central obstacle in overcoming that crisis. What happened in Central and Eastern Europe was a victory for the people in their struggle for freedom and for the implementation of fundamental human rights.

It was by no means inevitable that these developments would unfold in a linear fashion in the direction of free democracy, with a sound economic basis, which is a precondition for genuine stability. The reforms are irreversible. But the outcome of the ongoing process remains uncertain, even when the people involved know exactly the

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ultimate goal towards which they are working. My notes attempt to shed light on the subliminal contradictions between the intended results and the unintended consequences of the measures taken.

The "old boys' network" of party cadres in Culture, Economy, and Administration which was not abolished but has been "redirected" *(gewendet)* presents a most destructive challenge for the creation of the new societal order. According to Vaclav Havel, "As a result of ideological targets, political loyalties, varied favours or extortionist commitment, the single-party system established long-term personal ties and dependencies on an unusually large scale. The links extended into the most remote corners of society and above all of the apparatus of state, where the Communist *nomenklatura* generally existed beneath the headquarters level."[1] What is more, a major enzyme for its cohesion and loyalty towards the political system was its opposition to the Federal Republic of Germany, which represented a permanent challenge.

Against this background, the last Communist government in East Berlin after mid-November 1989 managed, on a substantial scale to cover up the destruction of the State Security Service *(Stasi)* files incriminating the Communist regime against the opposition of the population and transferred considerable assets to Stasi members, which not only gave the recipients financial benefits but also, in many instances, safeguarded positions of political power.

Ferdinand Kroch's analysis for eastern Germany in 1992 reflects the East in general:

Wherever they can, former Communist power elites are taking hold of the "economic foundation" by buying profitable companies and handing over the remaining mass of firms to the taxpayer. At the same time, like-minded comrades at the "intellectual superstructure" level are not only ensuring that no public fuss is made about these activities, but also that the tremendous reconstruction attempts by the new democratic state and by the free and western-oriented market forces are presented as perfidious action against the people. The success of such power retention strategies by those who ruined the GDR under their rule impedes and jeopardizes the process of restructuring in eastern Germany.[2]

This leads to Kroch's questions which still remain unanswered today: "To what ends will the forces trained in Communist conspiracy, strategy, and tactics exert their influence? Is

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financial gratification the only aim? Will the Communist forces be willing to accept compromise and to demonstrate loyal cooperation, as observed among the former elites in other revolutions, or can a different code of behavior be expected in the case of the Communists?"[3]

The persistent re-naming of the revolution to "re-irection"/ "change" *(Wende)* by those forces eloquently reflects the longstanding efforts for legitimization as practiced by representatives of the old regimes which would not have been possible without the "tolerance" of the citizens' movement.

In the Fall of 1989, the need for theories existed which, freed from the East-West conflict, questioned the origin of the identity crisis, searched for criteria of new social ethics, and demanded viable political ideas.

According to Helga Schubert at a forum discussion of the Adenauer Foundation: "In general, these groups reflected political currents of thought whose political goals and hopes were associated with the continued existence of the GDR with a reformed socialist-style systems. Reforms were the main aspects. The revolution was a result, not the aim of activities during the take-off phase."[4]

The revolutionary ambitions before 9 October 1989, were in large hindered by the different national self-awareness in West Germany. As Vettig summarizes:

> Following the ideological revolution of the West German Left in 1968, there was often a conviction in the corresponding circles that the Germans should never again become a nation in view of their past national guilt. They had discredited themselves once and for all through their former national ambitions and had to expiate their guilt by renouncing not only a nation-state but also a national identity. Many leftists also took the view that the Germans should never again be allowed to exercise far-reaching decision-making powers. In some left-wing circles, therefore, the elimination of German nature became an undisputed postulate. Adding to the foreign policy goal on integration, those who held such views also postulated the domestic policy goal of creating a "multicultural society." An overlaying of German nature through alien components was regarded and encouraged by such circles as progress towards greater humanization. The envisaged de *nationalization of the Federal Republic of Germany was perceived as a prelude to the Europe and worldwide elimination of "national-*

narrow-mindedness" in general. Notions of this kind explained why some left-wing German intellectuals failed to understand and to accept the unification of their native country in 1989/90.[5]

It was during this culmination phase of the revolution, which lasted about six months, from 9 October 1989 to 18 March 1990 that the German masses in the East insisted on the termination of the division of their country. It was their pressure "from below" which formed the policy and created history.

It is clearly evident that the reunified Germany has irrevocably become part of the West and that the dissolution of the Soviet empire could not change this in the least; it had not created the "Russian Option." The only realistic question was: Where would the eastern frontiers of Atlantic civilization run in the future?

But what exactly is European Identity? "To me, all those nations are European which were exposed during the course of their history to the three-fold influence of Athens, Rome and Jerusalem," Paul Valery declared in a famous lecture he gave in the twenties.[6]

Today, without hesitation, we would also mention Celtic, Germanic, as well as Slavic roots. Nor should the influence of Arabic countries be ignored. And in this connection, would it be wrong to refer to the scientific and liberal approach, or to Romanticism and Socialism?

Precisely which western values are basic to democracy? Inevitably, the focus falls loosely on the set of values called "individualism," however vague and slightly pejorative the term may sound. Western democracy has been founded on a specific understanding of the individual as an autonomous being. This understanding means that the individual has a capacity for freedom, for realizing himself in the course of his actions, and that he has inherent rights over and against the demands of any community to which he may belong.

It is not difficult to trace the source of these notions in the convergence of two cultural streams: the first originates in biblical religion, with Protestantism playing a decisive role in its application to political democracy; the second, rooted in the Hellenic view of man, transmits to modernity via the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, as applied to the French Revolution and its successors.

But just as democracy is an idea that manifests itself in concrete institutions and social processes, so the autonomous individual is not only an idea but also a lived experience. Actual human beings must feel themselves to be autonomous, to be free or aspiring to freedom, to have inherent rights.

Experiences through which these ideas and values become plausible in actual life are necessary. That Western individualism has been challenged from within Western culture, notably by Marxism, complicates the situation. The unusual assumptions of Western individualism become sharply evident as soon as one compares them with what is taken for granted in the great majority of non-Western cultures, in all parts of the world, and indeed in the traditional substrata of Western societies as well, as in the remaining peasant cultures of southern Europe.

As Peter L. Berger states, "democracy is not a 'luxury of the rich,' as has been argued; the rich, with or without democracy, usually manage to take care of themselves."[7] If democracy is indeed a political structure to safeguard the rights and liberties of the individual, it also happens to offer the most plausible structure for the protection of traditional values.

The state is not the only threat to traditional values. Other modern institutions and processes, the focus of the market and of technology, modern urban life, mass communication, create their own threat.

The history of the European Union as an institutional mechanism of democracy shows that it not only allows but also creates breathing space to traditional values and institutions. Only the democracy fosters pluralism and coexistence between modernized and more traditional sectors of society.

But what is essential to all this, democracy is the most practical method for safeguarding those "mediating structures" that are, themselves, the matrix of democracy. "Mediating structures" are institutions that give shape to people's private identities but also help them relate to the large structures of modern society. These institutions exist both in highly modern and in less developed societies. They are important to both. The most important of these are the *family, organized religion,* and the *local community.*

Others are such innovations as *cooperatives, labor unions,* and various *associations* to protect or promote particular interests.

Virtually everywhere, people have a strong interest in these institutions because their most precious values and self-identifications are closely bound to them.

As we all have experienced in the past, totalitarian states, by their very nature, cannot tolerate even the relative independence of such institutions. These must be leveled, controlled, and integrated into the all- embracing polity. Six years after the "velvet revolution" the situation in the former Communist states asks for a spirited Westernization of public life.

The lack of a more thoroughgoing democratic component within the all-European framework has meant that "there has been little discussion during more recent times about the meaning and the purpose of the EU," as F. Michael Prince points out.[8] European integration was a product of an early post-war desire:

> To preempt any resurgence of the kind of eruptions that precipitated the Second World War. This desire was welded together with the promise of prosperity for all to create the political and economic conditions that would reduce the likelihood of war. As a process of this post-war need for security and reassurance, the EU today is confronted by the fact that it no longer possesses the *Wert an sich* (self-evident value) it once did; its appeal to a so-called post-materialist culture, spoiled by the expectation of prosperity and peace, has ebbed.[9]

As the transparency of the European policy-making structure grows dimmer and the number of members grows larger, the greater will become the need for the cultures to renew public commitment to the idea of Europe.

It is not so much diversity in the sources of European cultural identity which is challenging, but rather the influence that such sources brought to bear on the principle of unity, that unity which is subliminally linked with this identity. Joseph Burckhardt formulated this as follows: "If, in largely intellectual matters, we do not feel we belong to this or that people, no longer to this country or that country, but feel that our allegiance is to Western culture, then this is because the world was once Roman and all-embracing and the whole culture of antiquity has devolved upon us."[10]

A multifarious cultural identity has developed from· this melting pot over the centuries and continues to flourish to the present day. And precisely here the great wealth of our continent is to be

found. Far from preserving unchanged what has been attained, by fearfully retiring into a cultural shell, this multifarious cultural identity constitutes a factor of living and original synthesis that is constantly renewing itself. This kind of identity consequently emerges as the precondition for individual, group, and national progress. It stimulates and establishes a community of interest, mobilizes inner reserves for action, and provides creative adjustment from necessary changes.

Denis de Rougement emphasized this:

> Each one of our cultures has to refind its personality, because fruitful dialogue is possible only between partners who are quite different and who know what they want, or who they are, or who at least passionately wish to fathom it. Nevertheless, none of our cultures, which have been personified this way, is an end in itself. Culture means just the totality of the means that are made available to people; they depend on culture in order to approach truth.[11]

Diversity in values, in communication, in religion, in technology, in everything from politics to poetry, begins to replace uniformity. New institutions, from self-help groups and political splinter organizations to transnational agencies, spring up in the rubble of the democratization. The Western societies are "demassified" as Alvin Toffler predicted for the eighties. The political, economical, and communication networks and bonds since the 1989 revolution developed into a global civilization on a cross-national and non-state base. It was Peter Brook who reminded us about this irresistible movement a year before the wall came down. "The valid truth is the truth of the moment. When many influences interact, through their converging rays, through their friction, a new view can emerge, fresh, surprising....even within a single culture, each individual is conditioned by an ever-wider mixture of global influences. As cultures intermingle, the audience is brought together before precise, yet universal truths."[12]

It is this challenge which engenders a mutual respect of nations, their progressive cooperation, and their integration with the aim of a common management of problems. But the structure of current relations in Europe and the nature of their resultant problems can only be properly understood against the background of the historic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. Overcoming the factors of uncertainty which existed for decades and

establishing a reliable and sustainable union between East and West does appear to be a real possibility. The challenge for culture today is how to use its anticipatory abilities. The dialectics of European identity shape the emerging outlines of the future.

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IOAN VALENTIN ISTRATI

The Virgin and the Spirit:
A Theological Reflection

The Orthodox feast of the Protection of the Most Holy Mother of God ("Pokrov" in Russian, "Acoperământul Maicii Domnului" – in Romanian) celebrates the power of Theotokos to shadow and preserve the humanity in a state of sacrifice and resurrection. The dignity of the Mother of God sitting on the right side of the heavenly Throne of her Son means both an ocean of love towards humanity and the hymn of praise brought to God by men.

The sacred and divine bond between the Holy Spirit and the Mother of God is obvious in all the history of salvation. Fruit of the blessing of the Comforter, the Virgin, the holy child, was kept in a state of purity and holiness by the Holy Spirit, all her childhood and youth. The state of virginity and continuous prayer is a gift of the Spirit. When the General of the celestial armies, Archangel Gabriel, came to announce her that she will give birth to God, he greets her: "Hail, Mary, full of grace", showing the divine intimacy between the Virgin Mary and the Holy Spirit. Then, when she asks how it is possible to give birth to a baby from virginity, the archangel answers: "the Holy Spirit will come upon you and the power of the Most High will shadow you". All her life, the Mother of heavenly love worked the humble joy of the Spirit. She was present at Pentecost, when the Church of Christ, that is His Body, was born in the world, among the Apostles. In this Descent of the Spirit, Christ became interior to every baptized believer in the name of the Most Holy Trinity.

In heaven, at the Throne of the glory of God, the Mother speaks incessantly with the Holy Spirit, imploring him to heal all the

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pain of the world. Every tear of humankind passes through the eyes full of heaven of the Mother of God, and arrives in the heart of the Trinity, where all the tears from all the faces are wiped out.

This holy connection between the Comforter and Theotokos has saving effects in the work of the Son to sanctify the world. The Holy Spirit is the Cover, the Protection of creation from the Genesis: "the Spirit was walking above the waters" (Gen. 1.2), meaning that – in the words of Saint Basil the Great – he was "warming and giving life to the waters, as a hen warming her chicken". So the Virgin of the tears is a cover and a protection, a shadow of salvation and a support, a loving and life giving warmth for the entire creation.

We say in one of the most common prayers of the Church: "My hope is the Father, my refuge is the Son and my protection is the Holy Spirit, Most Holy Trinity, glory to Thee" (the prayer of Saint Ioanikios). This holy protection is brought by the holy prayers of the Mother of God, through the vigil of the Virgin for the Church.

The Holy Spirit is the Guide of the entire universe toward its vocation in the Kingdom of God. And the Mother of God is the "Hodegetria", the Directress, the Guide to her Son, listening all the prayers of the world and hiding them in the infinite heart of Christ.

The Holy Spirit is praying for us "with wordless groans" (Romans 8, 26), healing our helplessness, in order to see the heavens of love, and the Mother of God is the incessant suppliant for every and each of us, the heart of a mother at the Throne of the Trinity, healing diseases and listening to the sufferance of the world.

The Holy Spirit is called by Christ himself "the Comforter" ("Parakletos"), the "Episkopos" of the hearts, as in the prayer: "Holy, search – "episkepse" and heal our iniquities, for thy name", and the Holy Virgin is the comforter to all who are in pain and illnesses.

The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of fruitful virginity, the spring of grace, and the Mother of God is the fruitful Virgin who gave birth to the Son of God, the "full of grace".

Therefore, the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church and the work of the Mother of God are divinely interconnected and fulfilling themselves. Nobody can receive the Holy Spirit if he (she) doesn't give birth to Christ in his heart, and nobody can give birth to Christ in his heart without the mystical work of the Spirit. Nobody can love the Theotokos without being carried on the wings full of light of the

Spirit. No man or woman can receive the scent of holiness without having a heart of a mother, and no man can carry God in his heart without the tearful prayers of the Virgin.

This is happening because in the heart of the Holy Mother are kept, like in a river bed of light, all the tears of the world, when she saw her Son crucified. All her pain became love full of grace when she saw him resurrected, in the overflow of the Spirit over the history.

The Holy Virgin is a spring of love, because she fulfils in her heart all the painful love of the man undressed of grace and all the longing of God to unite with us. Her mercies flow toward humanity without waiting confirmation, but incessantly flooding the sweetness of love from her motherly heart.

The entire universe, pregnant with God, beholds its mother and learns how to fill itself with the light that rises from the eternal One. The humanity enters the mysteries of history and learns the Eucharistic becoming of matter into energy through grace, as a birth of the kingdom without death.

We see a little virgin and we understand the greatness of the love of God. We look at a woman and we learn the unspeakable wisdom of the Trinity. We see a fragile human being and we understand beyond tears how much a creature can rise through love. We kiss with our soul a baby, and we are disciples at the theological cathedra of the ages. Her silence is more priceless than all the words of this world. For the greatest power of the universe is the life giving love, the self sacrifice. And the greatest light in the world is the power to love an eternity those who killed your baby.

If we are friends of Theotokos all our life, we will find her waiting for us in the heaven, soothing our passage from darkness to light, recognising in our eyes the look of her Son that we wanted and missed all our life.

During the presentations

Group of participants

Left and below:
The "Spiritus" Art Gallery
(Viorica Colpacci)

Elena Mitru and her vestimentary
art exhibition

MAXIM (IULIU-MARIUS) MORARIU

Imaginea părintelui Dumitru Stăniloae în viziunea Sandei Stolojan/
The Image of Father Dumitru Stăniloae
in the Vision of Sanda Stolojan

Abstract. In this research paper, the author tries to explore how the image of father Dumitru Stăniloae is reflected in the *Diary of Paris exile* of the Romanian writer Sanda Stolojan, who was an important personality of the Romanian exile in France, with connections to personalities like Emil Cioran (whose work *Tears and Saints* she translated into French), Monica Lovinescu, Virgil Ierunca, Vintilă Horia or Paul Goma, nephew of the famous Romanian writer Duiliu Zamfirescu. She emigrated in 1961 and established herself in Paris, where she worked as a translator for important personalities like the President of France, Charles de Gaulle. In the same time she was an active supporter of Romanians persecuted for political reasons, as the president of the *League for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania* from Paris, between 1984 and 1991, and a well known author of articles in journals like: *Journal de Geneve, Esprit, Cahiers de L'Est* (that she founded)*, Le Monde, L'Alternative, Lettre Internationale,* or *ARA Journal.* She also wrote and published diaries and memories.

In one of these, the Parisian journal *(Diary of Paris exile)* she evokes some meetings with Father Dumitru Stăniloae, an outstanding theologian and orthodox spiritual personality of Romania during the communist period. We will try to present here these evocations and to show how she sees the Romanian theologian. We will also

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emphasize the way in which the discourse and the ideas of Fr. Stăniloae were influenced by the fact that he was persecuted and imprisoned by the communist terror regime in Romania under Ceauşescu and his wife Elena. The work will bring to attention an image of the renowned Romanian theologian that is different from the one with whom theological circles have accustomed readers and will focus on his influence on the secular intellectual Romanian diaspora in France.

Keywords: Romanian exile in France, anticommunism, resistance, Saint Serge Institute, theology, *Dogmatics*.

Într-un text publicat în numerele anterioare ale revistei *Symposium*[1], protestam împotriva faptului că părintele Stăniloae a fost de-a dreptul confiscat de cercetarea teologică. Cei care scriu despre el sunt cu precădere oameni din spaţiul mai sus-pomenit. Ei valorifică cu precădere aspecte privitoare la opera sa de specialitate şi publică texte ce se adresează unui segment specializat de cititori. În plus, aproape că omit latura umană şi capacitatea de a interacţiona cu intelectualii şi alţi exponenţi ai spaţiului laic, a marelui teolog român.

Pledam atunci pentru redescoperirea modului în care imaginea lui este creionată în paginile unor jurnale, memorii, evocări sau articole redactate de oameni care au interacţionat puţin cu spaţiul şi mediul teologic. Am oferit atunci ca exemplu evocările Monicăi Lovinescu, arătând că în paginile lor pot fi regăsite consideraţii interesante atât cu privire la biografia, cât şi la opera marelui părinte.

În continuarea acestui demers, propun în aceste rânduri readucerea în atenţie a modului în care este descris părintele Stăniloae în însemnările Sandei Stolojan (1919-2005). Nepoată a lui Duiliu Zamfirescu, absolventă a Facultăţii de Litere din Bucureşti, ea va fi o personalitate importantă a exilului românesc. Traducătoare prolifică[2], poetă, scriitoare de roman[3] sau editoare de corespondenţă[4] fondatoare de revistă, autoare a unor opere interesante, prezentă în paginile operelor de referinţă dedicate fie exilului românesc, fie culturii feminine româneşti,[5] ea va rămâne în istorie nu atât pentru publicistica ce-i poartă semnătura, cât mai ales pentru relaţiile pe care le va avea cu nume de seamă ale exilului parizian şi nu numai, precum Emil Cioran,[6] Monica Lovinescu, Vintilă Horea, Paul Goma etc. Va fi, într-un fel, omul de casă al familiei Lovinescu-Ierunca, fapt ce

explică recurentele referiri la numele ei în paginile jurnalelor celor doi soţi.[7] Cioran, căruia îi va traduce îl limba franceză volumul *Lacrimi şi sfinţi,[8]* i se va confesa adeseori, după cum reiese din paginile memoriilor ei[9], la fel ca şi soţii mai sus pomeniţi în vreme ce, cu alte nume importante ale românismului din spaţiul francez, se va întâlni şi va interacţiona regulat.

În plus, se va remarca prin activitatea de militant, fiind preşedintele *Ligii pentru Apărarea Drepturilor Omului în România* de la Paris, între anii 1984-1991[10] şi cea de publicist, fiind colaboratoarea unor reviste precum: *Limite, Ethos, Fiinta romaneasca, Revista scriitorilor romani*; *Journal de Geneve, Esprit, Cahiers de L'Est* (pe care a şi înfiinţat-o)*, Le Monde, L'Alternative, Lettre Internationale,* sau *ARA Journal* etc.[11]

Interacţiunile cu ei sau activitatea de interpret a unor diplomaţi importanţi sau a unor oameni de prim rang ai lumii politice franceze, marcată de evenimente importante, la fel ca şi alte aspecte ale vieţii cotidiene, vor constitui subiectele însemnărilor zilnice din paginile unor jurnale sau conţinutul memoriilor. De altfel, la acest segment, Sanda Stolojan se va remarca prin consecvenţă scriitoricească, publicând mai multe volume ce pot fi subsumate acestei categorii.[12] Apărute iniţial în limba franceză, ele vor fi traduse după anul 1989 şi în limba română şi vor fi bine primite de către publicul cititor. Locul ei în mişcarea de rezistenţă a exilului românesc este însă, în ciuda anilor scurşi deja de la evenimentele petrecute în anul 1989, doar parţial recunoscut, poate şi din pricina discreţiei care i-a marcat întreaga biografie.

Între personalităţile pe care le evocă în paginile însemnărilor ei, se numără şi teologul pomenit, asupra căruia ne-am propus să ne oprim în paginile cercetării de faţă. Spre deosebire de Monica Lovinescu, care are mai multe interacţiuni cu părintele Stăniloae şi ţine să prezinte în paginile ei şi anumite constatări cu privire la opera lui,[13] creionându-i o imagine pozitivă, dar care nu este lipsită de anumite critici referitoare la opera lui, scriitoarea de faţă nu prezintă decât două scurte descrieri ale întâlnirilor pe care le-a avut cu el, reliefându-i pe de-o parte preocupările şi grijile, pe de alta bucuriile şi prezentând aspecte privitoare la modul său de a gândi şi de a înţelege lumea.

Evocările ei sunt importante atât din motivele enunţate mai sus, cât şi pentru că ne prezintă un teolog cu o imagine uşor diferită de cea cu care ne-am obişnuit. Dacă în paginile tratatelor de teologie sau ale traducerilor, amprenta personală transpare mai degrabă la nivel stilistic, în cazul traducerilor, sau din modul în care interpretează anumite pasaje din operele Sfinţilor Părinţi, aducându-le în actualitate, acestea nereliefând preocupările lui interioare privitoare la viaţa de zi cu zi, în descrierile Sandei Stolojan, lucrurile sunt uşor diferite.

Vizibil marcat de teroarea ce domnea în spaţiul românesc şi se manifesta cu precădere asupra libertăţii de exprimare, dânsul va fi destul de timorat în interacţiunea cu scriitoarea. Cu toate acestea, va demonstra că presiunile la care a fost supus în ţară nu l-au făcut să-şi piardă capacitatea de a gândi normal, de a avea opinii şi de a evalua în mod obiectiv anumite situaţii. Discuţiile lui cu Sanda Stolojan dovedesc acest lucru. În plus, între cei doi interlocutori domneşte o atmosferă prietenoasă. Amprenta pe care teologul român o lasă asupra scriitoarei este şi ea una puternică. Vădit impresionată de prezenţa şi anvergura lui duhovnicească şi culturală, ea îl va descrie în tuşe foarte pozitive. Prima întâlnire evocată în paginile jurnalului parizian se va petrece în data de 26 mai 1976. În prezentarea scurtă şi concentrată a ei, se va limita la a descrie principalele frământări ale interlocutorului, care vor fi dublate de propria percepţie a autoarei cu privire la el. Iată cum arată descrierea acestei întâlniri în paginile operei pomenite:

„26 mai (1976)

Părintele Stăniloae mi-a dat întâlnire pe o bancă din faţa bisericii ruse de pe strada Daru. Îl găsesc preocupat de venirea fiicei sale în Franţa şi de traducerea ultimelor sale cărţi la Paris (un Tratat de Mistică[14] şi o Dogmatică[15]). Sunt sedusă de stilul omului. Văd în părintele Stăniloae ceea ce spiritul ortodox a produs mai elevat: rigoarea judecăţii combinată cu bunătatea inimii reprezintă în ochii mei umanismul creştin în versiunea lui orientală cea mai nobilă. Contactul cu această formă de spirit îmi dă un fel de jubilare interioară. Ne vom întâlni la toamnă la Congresul organizat de ortodocşii francezi la Amiens".[16]

Din nefericire, întâlnirea petrecută la congresul ortodox de la Amiens nu se va regăsi între însemnările scriitoarei. Preocupată de descrierea unor fenomene precum conflictul dintre Virgil Gheorghiu

şi Monica Lovinescu, cazul Goma[17] sau alte chestiuni similare, ea va prefera să le imortalizeze pe acestea în paginile însemnărilor ei, în locul evenimentului religios. Aşa se face că, următoarea evocare a părintelui Stăniloae în paginile jurnalului parizian al Sandei Stolojan se va petrece abia în anul 1981, când acesta se va afla la Paris pentru a primi titlul de *doctor honoris causa* al Institutului Saint Serge, fondat de teologii Ortodocşi ruşi din exil în Paris.[18] Textul ei seamănă izbitor de mult cu evocarea dedicată întâlnirii prilejuite de acelaşi episod de către Monica Lovinescu,[19] care preia însemnarea în două dintre jurnalele sale.[20] De această dată, descrierea este mai amplă iar atenţia scriitoarei nu este focalizată doar asupra personalităţii celui cu care interacţionează, ci şi asupra locului în care este găzduit, asupra operei, a politicii religioase şi teologice internaţionale şi a politicii româneşti:

„iunie (1981)

Mă duc să-l văd pe părintele Stăniloae la Saint-Serge, unde locuieşte într-o cameră de student. Se află la Paris de câteva zile. Nimeni n-a ştiut că va primi titlul de "doctor honoris causa", nici un român n-a fost de faţă la ceremonie. După părerea lui Olivier Clement, care a ţinut o frumoasă cuvântare, ruşii de la Saint-Serge nu sunt prea încântaţi, dat fiind ambiţia rusească de-a fi în materie de ortodoxie cei dintâi, dar sunt obligaţi să se încline în faţa lui Stăniloae şi în faţa unui teolog ca Olivier Clement. Mai e ceva: teama de a displăcea Patriarhiei din Bucureşti, de vreme ce singurii prezenţi erau celălalt preot român şi episcopul, numiţi de Bucureşti la Paris. Părintele Stăniloae mi-a vorbit despre lucrările lui: *Dogmatica,* acum tradusă în toate marile limbi, volumul X din *Filocalie,* publicat de Olivier Clement la editorul Desclees, şi o carte despre iubire publicată în Elveţia.

Despre situaţia din România spune că niciodată n-a fost atât de umilit poporul român ca acum. A vorbit cu scârbă şi despre cultul personalităţii lui Ceauşescu, de caracterul diabolic al sistemului care-l apără. Nu se poate apropia nimeni de el. E înconjurat de o pază extraordinară. În posturile supreme a pus numai rude şi oameni apropiaţi. Până şi Securitatea, zice părintele Stăniloae, s-ar fi săturat de regim. Pe urmă, mizeria, cozile, lipsurile – la sate mai ales. Părintele Stăniloae mi-a făcut aceeaşi impresie de curaj şi autenticitate ca altădată. O judecată fără greş, o înţelepciune trecută

printr-o minte *tradiţională,* capabilă să fie în acelaşi timp de mare actualitate".[21]

După ce descrie succint detaliile spaţiale ale întâlnirii şi fericitul eveniment căruia teologul român îi este protagonist, care îi generează însă stări de angoasă din pricina faptului de a fi fost unul fortuit (fapt ce ar putea da emoţii Securităţii de la Bucureşti, obsedată cu supravegherea îndeaproape a celor care părăseau ţara, dar şi mediului teologic, afectând contextul unei politici bisericeşti şi aşa destul de fragile), ea descrie în mod cronologic evoluţia dialogului avut cu el. Vorbeşte despre modul în care i-a descris teologul bucuria pricinuită de traducerea *Dogmaticii* sau publicarea unor alte volume (volumul X din *Filocalie* şi un volum despre iubire apărut în Elveţia),[22] şi relaţia lui cu Olivier Clement, pe atunci personalitate importantă a Institutului pomenit. Apoi, în cea de-a doua parte a conversaţiei, părintele îi oferă interlocutoarei sale o descriere detaliată a situaţiei României din ultima parte a comunismului, evidenţiind probleme precum nepotismul, sărăcia, mizeriile şi cozile. Descrierea lui o face pe scriitoare să îşi sporească admiraţia atât faţă de personajul pe care îl are în faţă, cât şi faţă de modul clar şi coerent de a vedea şi înţelege lucrurile.

Ultima parte a discuţiei celor doi relevă mai multe lucruri. Pe de-o parte, ea arată că relaţiile dintre scriitoare şi teologul român deveniseră foarte cordiale, iar raportul de încredere pe care părintele îl avea în ea, era unul foarte ridicat. În alte condiţii, el nu şi-ar fi permis cu certitudine să-i împărtăşească atât de detaliat situaţia din România şi să-i descrie într-o manieră atât de amănunţită nu doar chestiuni privitoare la viaţa cotidiană şi socială de aici, ci şi elemente privitoare la cea politică. Apoi, faptul că aceasta a notat această convorbire în paginile jurnalului ei, într-o vreme în care exponenţii de seamă ai exilului erau supravegheaţi, Securitatea încercând prin toate mijloacele fie cooptarea lor în rândurile colaboratorilor, fie intimidarea lor, spune şi el multe lucruri. Ne arată că nu se mai simţea atât de ameninţată de repetatele supravegheri şi că-şi permitea să-şi noteze fără a se cenzura în nici un fel şi fără a face o selecţie a informaţiilor bazându-se pe riscul la care i-ar expune pe cei evocaţi în jurnal în cazul unei descoperiri a acestuia de către oamenii puterii din spaţiul românesc.

Datorită acestor note, aspecte interesante privitoare la părintele Dumitru Stăniloae, care ar fi rămas altminteri cu certitudine inedite, sunt prezentate în paginile jurnalului parizian al Sandei Stolojan. Gândurile ei aşternute în scris sunt importante atât datorită veridicităţii informaţiilor pe care le oferă, cât şi pentru faptul că prezintă un altfel de părinte Stăniloae, mai apreciat în Occident decât acasă, modest şi onest, speriat din mai mai multe motive de gândul succesului, care, în ciuda tuturor experienţelor care l-au marcat, reuşeşte încă să se menţină liber la nivelul raţiunii şi este capabil de o evaluare obiectivă a situaţiei româneşti, denotând şi la acest nivel o inteligenţă şi capacitate de înţelegere aparte.

NOTES:

[1] Maxim (Iuliu-Marius) Morariu, "Părintele Dumitru Stăniloae în viziunea Monicăi Lovinescu," în *Symposium,* nr. XXIV – "Knowledge and Enchantment: A World without Mystery? The Twenty-fourth Ecumenical Theological and Interdisciplinary Symposium," New York, 2017, pp. 49-58.

[2] Ofelia M. Uţă Burcea, "El exilio español (1939-1989). Actitudes y relaciones entre los intelectuales rumanos," in *Philologica Jassyensia,* XII (2016), no. 2, p. 308.

[3] Autoarea unor volume precum: Sanda Stolojan, *Maison pour un mirage,* col. "Terre d'encre," Les Éditions du Laquet, Martel, 2003; Sanda Stolojan, *Avec de Gaulle en Roumanie,* col. "Mémorables," L'Herne, Paris, 1991; Sanda Stolojan, *Cu de Gaulle în România: în anexa textul inedit al convorbirii dintre de Gaulle şi Ceauşescu din 14 mai 1994,* Editura Albatros, Bucureşti, 1994; Sanda Stolojan, *Duiliu Zamfirescu,* col. "Twayne's World Authors Series," vol. 551, New York, Twaine, 1980.

[4] Sanda Stolojan, *Sub semnul depărtării corespondenţa Constantin Noica - Sanda Stolojan*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2006.

[5] Precum: George Marcu (coord.), *Dicţionarul personalităţilor feminine din România,* Editura Meronia, Bucureşti, 2009; Daniel Florin Predoiu, *S'initier à l'errance en la racontant: l'exil, l'identité et la mémoire dans les journaux intimes de trois intellectuels roumains,* Éditions Universitaires Européennes, Saarbrücken, 2011.

[6] Cf. Marta Petreu, *Despre bolile filosofilor – Cioran,* ediţia a 3-a, col. "Eseu," Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2017.

[7] Cf. Virgil Ierunca, *Trecut-au anii... fragmente de jurnal, întâmpimări şi accente, scrisori nepierdute,* Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2000; Monica Lovinescu, *La apa Vavilonului,* col. "Memorii-Jurnale-Convorbiri," Editura Humanitas, 1999.

[8] Emil Cioran, *Des larmes et des saints,* trad. SandaStolojan, Editions de l'Herne, Paris, 1986.

[9] Iată un astfel de exemplu: 26 mai (1976)
"I-am făcut o vizită lui Cioran. Mă aştepta cu o tavă de brânzeturi şi fructe. Avea chef de vorbă, îi place să readucă pe tapet vechile poveşti româneşti, deşi pretinde că s-a detaşat complet de ele. I-am spus că ascultasem în ajun interviul lui Const. Virgil Gheorghiu cu o romancieră în vogă şi că jucase rolul sfântului, mai ipocrit ca niciodată. Cioran s-a strâmbat îngrozitor, imitându-l pe Virgil Gheorghiu, cu surâsul lui infect şi accentul său îngrozitor. "E leit Smerdiakov", zice el. Cioran îl cunoaşte bine pe C. V. Gheorghiu şi este la curent cu povestea succesului *Orei 25.* Cioran n-a uitat niciodată triumful lui Virgil Gheorghiu, dar adaugă că personajul a trădat pe toată lumea, este infam. Linguşelile sale sunt neruşinate. A fost pierdut pentru literatură în urma scandalului care a urmat *Orei 25,* scandal declanşat de Ierunca, teleghidat de Mircea Eliade, gelos pe succesul romanului, dixit Cioran. Dar C. V. Gh. are la ora actuală un public pentru romanele sale. Explicaţia cazului Gheorghiu? Are un real talent de barbar care îi distrează pe civilizaţii obosiţi şi vlăguiţi de orice vitalitate. Cioran îl crede şi cam smintit. Este mai ales odios, am adăugat eu, fiindcă se serveşte de religie pentru a-şi face publicitate". Sanda Stolojan, *Nori peste balcoane. Jurnal din exilul parizian,* trad. din franceză de Micaela Slăvescu, revizuită de Sanda Stolojan, col. "Memorii – jurnale," Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1996, pp. 22-23.

[10] http://www.humanitas.ro/sanda-stolojan, accesat 12. 01. 2018.

[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] Sanda Stolojan, *Să nu plecăm toţi odată: amintiri din România anilor '50,* col. "Memorii, jurnale," Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2009; Sanda Stolojan, *Au balcon de l'exil roumain à Paris. Avec Cioran, Eugène Ionesco, Mircea Eliade, Vintila Horia…,* col. "Aujourd'hui l'Europe," Editions L'Harmattan, Paris, 1999; Sanda Stolojan, *Amurg senin: jurnal din exilul parizian: 1997-2001,* col. "Memorii, jurnale," trad. Dana Petrişor, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2007.

[13] Monica Lovinescu, *Jurnal (1981-1984),* ediţia a II-a revăzută, col. "Memorii – jurnale – convirbiri," Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 78.

¹⁴ Este vorba despre o ediţie mai veche a volumului: Dumitru Stăniloae, *Ascetica şi Mistica Bisericii Ortodoxe,* col. "Scrieri," vol. 1, Editura Institutului Biblic şi de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, Bucureşti, 2002.

¹⁵ Este vorba despre primul volum al *Teologiei Dogmatice* a părintelui. A se vedea: Dumitru Stăniloae, *Teologia dogmatică ortodoxă,* vol. 1, ediţia a 2-a, col. "Bibliotecă teologică. Teologi ortodocşi români," Editura Institutului Biblic şi de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, Bucureşti, 1996. De altfel, acest volum va fi, la scurtă vreme după publicarea în spaţiul francez, intens mediatizat în paginile periodicului *Irenikon* al abaţiei de la Chevegtone, de către un ucenic al părintelui, pe atunci profesor la Institutul Ecumenic de la Bossey, devenit între timp cel de-al cincilea Patriarh al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române. Vezi: Dan I. Ciobotea, "Une dogmatique pour l'homme d'aujourd'hui," în *Irenikon,* LIV (1981), no. 4, p. 472-482

¹⁶ Sanda Stolojan, *Nori peste balcoane. Jurnal din exilul parizian,* p. 41.

¹⁷ Iată, de exemplu, ce va scrie cu privire la aceste subiecte în 1981: "Mare fierbere în exilul românesc de la Paris. Paul Goma a primit un pachet-capcană, de asemenea şi fostul ministru ţărănist, Nicolae Penescu. Au primit fiecare câte un pachet de cărţi conţinând o bombă, pe care poliţia a dezamorsat-o, dar care l-a rănit totuşi pe Penescu la faţă. Legătura dintre cele două şi recenta conferinţă de la Madrid era evidentă. Amândoi se duseseră la Madrid pentru a denunţa regimul de la Bucureşti. Din culisele exilului a răsărit spectrul spaimei. Unii au început să răspândească vorbe calomnioase, cum că Paul Goma şi cei care-l susţin ar fi în realitate agenţi ai KGB-ului. Const. Virgil Gheorghiu, preot, dar făţarnic din cap până în picioare, a dat un interviu în *Figaro,* unde ne caracteriza drept "agenţi tulburi." Am aflat de la DST că ordinul de trimitere a pachetelor-capcană fusese dat de Ceauşescu în persoană, cu scopul de a-i intimida pe refugiaţii care-i strică politica. Îmi jurasem să nu mă mai las antrenată, să rezist la reacţiile colective. Dar solidaritatea şi indignarea m-au împins să scriu o scrisoare la *Figaro.* Nici o reacţie. Am trimis un articol la revista *Esprit* pentru a protesta împotriva acuzaţiilor insidioase ale lui C. Virgil Gheorghiu (căruia *Figaro* i-a oferit o tribună). *Esprit* mi-a publicat articolul. De n-ar fi prezenţa reală a teroriştilor veniţi din Est, care ne dau târcoale, toată această agitaţie ar avea un caracter derizoriu care nu-mi scapă. Povestea pare absurdă, dar experienţa ne-a învăţat că prezenţa agenţilor poliţiei secrete a lui Ceauşescu la Paris nu este o fantasmă. Dimpotrivă. Iată ce explicam deunăzi unei persoane care mă întreba ce căutăm în toate aceste acţiuni (manifestaţii, drepturi ale omului, proteste etc.). Am răspuns: adevărat, Exilul este înainte de toate o experienţă *personală,* dar o experienţă pe care aşa de mulţi au trăit-o încât o poţi

considera ca o dramă colectivă care te provoacă, te obligă să reacţionezi". *Ibidem,* pp. 104-105.

[18] Pentru mai multe informaţii cu privire la acest episod, a se vedea şi: http://basilica.ro/16-noiembrie-1903-111-ani-de-la-nasterea-parintelui-dumitru-staniloae/, accesat 12. 01. 2018; http://www.spiritualite-orthodoxe.net/dumitru_staniloae_theologie_orthodoxe.html, accesat 12. 01. 2018; Victor Botez, "Dumitru Stăniloae. A missionary of sacredness," în *Analele Academiei Oamenilor de Ştiinţă din România – Series on Philosophy, Psychology and Theology,* XV (2013), no. 1-2, pp. 42-74.

[19] Aceasta notează următoarele: "Sâmbătă, 10 Octombrie (1981) După amiaza – Părintele Stăniloae cu fiica lui. A ţinut să ne aducă ultima lui carte şi a avut curajul să scrie o dedicaţie (nu toţi îl au). Parcă visez la un alt timp, în care l-aş fi putut avea aproape şi aş fi învăţat şi eu ceva din ortodoxie şi despre Dumnezeu.

Mare căldură, pace – amară - (timpul i se pare a merge spre sfârşitul lui), o umilinţă cinstită (ne-excluzând sentimentul valorii sale). Cuvinte simple, de toate zilele. Nici o emfază, nici o retorică. Prin Nicu Steinhardt (şi poate altădată Yvonne Rosignon), aş fi putut că cred. P. St. m-ar fi putut învăţa ce e credinţa." Monica Lovinescu, *Jurnal (1981-1984),* p. 23.

[20] Monica Lovinescu, *Jurnal esenţial,* ed. Cristina Cioabă, col. "Zetgeist", Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2010, pp. 25-26.

[21] Sanda Stolojan, *Nori peste balcoane. Jurnal din exilul parizian,* p. 110-111.

[22] Al cărui titlu nu am reuşit să îl identificăm însă, căci volumul *Sfânta Treime sau la început a fost iubirea* (Dumitru Stăniloae, *Sfânta Treime sau La început a fost iubirea,* Editura Institutului Biblic şi de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, Bucureşti, 1993), despre care bănuiam că ar putea fi vorba, a fost publicat abia postum şi deci, nu se punea problema unei traduceri.

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The XXVth Ecumenical Theological and Interdisciplinary Symposium

Nation and Identity: Reconciling the Traditional Sense of Belonging with the Globalist Tendencies of Current Post-Culturalism

Saturday, December 2nd, 2017

Metropolitan College of New York
60 West Street, New York, NY 10006

Theodor Damian, PhD
Professor of Philosophy and Ethics, Metropolitan College of New York;
President of the Romanian Institute of Orthodox Theology and Spirituality:
Nationalism vs. Globalism. The Cultural Meaning of Borders

Humphrey Crookendale, JD
Dean of School for Public Affairs and Administration,
Metropolitan College of New York:
Communication and Identity in American Politics

Richard Grallo, PhD
Professor of Applied Psychology, Metropolitan College of New York:
Fooling Ourselves with Personal Identity

Louis Tietje, PhD
Professor of Ethics,
Metropolitan College of New York:
Driverless Cars: A New Occasion for the Trolley Problem

Doru Tsaganea, PhD
Professor of Mathematics,
Metropolitan College of New York:
Nation, Nationalism and Nation State in Historical Perspective

Alina Feld, PhD
Affiliate Faculty at the General Theological Seminary, New York:
Cosmopolitanism or Recognizing Humanity on the Other: Simone Weil and Martha Nussbaum

David Rosner, PhD
Associate Professor of Values and Ethics,
Metropolitan College of New York:
How Can the Ancient Teachings of Xenophanes of Colophon Be Applied to the Contemporary Problem of Globalization?

Guests of Honor:
His Eminence Nicolae Condrea, PhD
Metropolitan of the Romanian Orthodox Metropolia of the Americas
Archbishop of the Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese of the United
States of America

Vinton Thompson, PhD
President of Metropolitan College of New York

Tilokie Depoo, PhD
Chief Academic Officer and Dean
School for Business
Metropolitan College of New York

Moderator:
Humphrey Crookendale, JD
Dean, School for Public Affairs and Administration,
Metropolitan College of New York

Discussant:
David Rosner, PhD
Associate Professor of Values and Ethics,
Metropolitan College of New York

"Spiritus" Art Gallery
(Director **Viorica Colpacci**)

Elena Mitru: Vestimentary art exhibit

Richard Grallo (left) and
Louis Tietje

Academic discussions

Richard Grallo (left),
Alina Feld and Louis Tietje

Doru Tsaganea (left) and
Theodor Damian

Alina Feld and
Theodor Damian

MCNY President
Vinton Thompson
with professors
who presented papers

Religion and Politics: The Human Society between the Power of God and the Power of Man
Symposium, Nr. XVII/1, 2010

Cult and Culture: The Transcendental Roots of Human Civilization
Symposium, Nr. XVI/1, 2009

Theology and Literature: The Deification of Imagination and Its Cathartic Function in Spiritual Growth
Symposium, Nr. XV/1, 2008

The Glory of Knowledge: Construction and Deconstruction. When Human Quest Ends in Apophasis
Symposium, Nr. XIV/1, 2007

Unity in Diversity: Can We Live Together in an Apocalyptic World?
Symposium, Nr. XIII/1, 2006

Globalization from A (Archeology) to S (Spirituality): What Is It and Who Needs It?
Symposium, Nr. XII/1, 2005

Science and Theology: New Challenges and Perspectives
Symposium, Nr. XI/1, 2004

Contemporary Culture in the Light of Christian Spirituality at the Beginning of the Third Millennium. The Secular Realities and Spiritual Perspectives
Symposium, Nr. X/1, 2003

Prayer as Theology of the Mind and of the Heart for the Humanity in the New Millennium
Symposium, Nr. IX/1, 2002

Humanity in the Third Millennium and the Mystery of the Divine
Symposium, Nr. VIII/1, 2001

Jesus Christ as the Theandric Paradigm of Man's Restoration at the Dawn of the Third Millennium
Symposium, Nr. VII/1, 2000

The Theological Legacy of Fr. Dumitru Staniloae and its Ecumenical Actuality
Symposium, Nr. VI/1, 1999

Rediscovering God: The Relation between God and Man and its Significance for our Life Today
Symposium, Nr. V/1, 1998

Freedom and Responsibility in Contemporary Society
Symposium, Nr. IV/1, 1997

Divine Creation and Human Responsibility in the Context of Contemporary Ecological Preoccupations
Symposium, Nr. III/1, 1996

Quo Vadis Homo? Salvation and the Modern World
Symposium, Nr. II/1, 1995

Worship and Identity in our Contemporary Society
Symposium, Nr. I/1, 1994